R v Mandeep Gurmukh

For a dog destruction order, the decision-maker must order destruction unless satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that the dog will not constitute a danger to public safety. The assessment is prospective and may consider the circumstances of the attack, the dog’s controllability and the seriousness of possible future consequences. An appellate challenge based only on disagreement with a carefully reasoned assessment, reached after applying the correct test and considering proposed conditions, is unarguable. A change in an expert’s opinion does not prevent reliance on the evidence ultimately given, and describing the decision as difficult does not invalidate it.

The applicant pleaded guilty to two offences under the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991 after her dog attacked two children and an adult. Following a hearing at which two experts gave evidence, the Crown Court at Stafford made a destruction order on 14 March 2025. The applicant contended that the recorder should have made a conditional destruction order because she had discharged the burden of showing that the dog would not endanger public safety. She also sought to rely on fresh expert evidence and sought disclosure. The central issue was whether the recorder was entitled to reach his conclusion on the evidence before him.

Outcome. The renewed application for leave to appeal was refused.

1. The applicable test required the recorder to make a destruction order unless satisfied that the dog would not constitute a danger to public safety. The burden lay on the applicant, and the standard was the balance of probabilities (para 4).
2. The recorder had correctly identified the issue, applied the correct law and carefully assessed the factual and expert evidence. His assessment was necessarily directed to the future. Considering whether a dog may pose a future danger was therefore not speculation. The unexplained aggression, absence of warning signs, the dog’s size and power, the difficulty of controlling it in a further attack and the possible severity of the consequences were matters capable of supporting his conclusion (paras 4–5, 11).
3. The proposed grounds amounted only to disagreement with the recorder’s assessment. The fact that he regarded the decision as difficult did not make it impermissible. A change in an expert’s opinion did not prevent reliance on the evidence given at the hearing, and the recorder had considered the proposed conditions for a conditional destruction order (para 11).
4. The proposed fresh evidence could have been addressed at the original hearing and had no bearing on the application. The disclosure request likewise provided no reason to delay consideration of the renewed application (paras 7–8). The proposed appeal was unarguable (para 12).

1. Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) — refused the renewed application for leave to appeal: [2025] EWCA Crim 1512.
2. Single judge of the Court of Appeal — refused leave to appeal.
3. Crown Court at Stafford — made a destruction order on 14 March 2025 after considering expert evidence and the applicant’s proposed safeguards.