R v Adnan Khan

In sentencing multiple offences, the court may select the offence carrying the greater sentence as the lead offence and impose concurrent sentences for the others, provided the overall sentence is not manifestly excessive. Victim impact evidence may justify the highest harm category where it demonstrates significant and lasting effects. The coincidence of offending with the lifting of Covid restrictions is not, without more, aggravating. The totality of all counts remains decisive. A Sexual Harm Prevention Order may be imposed after conviction, but its duration must be justified and cannot be extended merely because the offender has a young child. The order and corresponding notification period were reduced from 20 years to 10 years.

The appellant pleaded guilty at the plea and trial preparation hearing to one offence under section 2 of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 and two counts under section 15A(1) and (3) of the Sexual Offences Act 2003. The Crown Court at Newcastle upon Tyne imposed 15 months’ imprisonment and a Sexual Harm Prevention Order for 20 years.

The appellant challenged the selection of the lead offence, the harm and culpability categorisation, the treatment of the lifting of Covid restrictions as aggravating, and the necessity and duration of the order. The central issues were whether the sentence was excessive and whether the duration of the order was justified.

1. Sentence appeal. The appeal against the custodial sentence was dismissed. The judge was entitled to treat the sexual communication offence as the lead offence and to impose a concurrent sentence for the harassment. That approach was permissible because the sexual communication offence carried the greater sentence in the context of the offending as a whole, the sentencing guideline and the maximum sentences, provided that the overall sentence was not manifestly excessive.

2. The judge was entitled to place the harm in Category 1. The victim impact evidence demonstrated significant and lasting effects, including fear of public places, reluctance or inability to walk to school, and continuing concern about what might have occurred had the victims entered the vehicle.

3. The court accepted that none of the culpability A factors was present and that culpability B might have been more appropriate. It also accepted that the fact that the offending occurred upon the lifting of lockdown restrictions was not itself an aggravating feature. Those points did not render the sentence excessive.

4. Considering totality, 21 months before credit for the guilty plea was not manifestly excessive. The appellant fell to be sentenced for two sexual communication offences, each with a one-year starting point, together with harassment which independently merited three or four months. The 15-month sentence therefore remained undisturbed.

5. The conviction justified imposing a Sexual Harm Prevention Order for some period. However, 20 years was excessive and could not be justified merely because the appellant had a young child. The court substituted a period of 10 years. In accordance with section 82 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, the notification period was also fixed at 10 years. The appeal was allowed in part, limited to reducing the duration of the order.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division), [2025] EWCA Crim 1518: allowed the appeal in part by reducing the Sexual Harm Prevention Order and corresponding notification period from 20 years to 10 years; the custodial sentence was upheld.
• Crown Court at Newcastle upon Tyne: following guilty pleas, imposed 15 months’ imprisonment and a 20-year Sexual Harm Prevention Order.