R v Daniel Lloyd & Anor

In sentencing for multiple offences, the fact that an offence is an attempt must be reflected in the sentence. Seriousness and aggravating circumstances do not justify ignoring the distinction between an attempt and completion. The totality principle requires the aggregate sentence to be just and proportionate to the overall offending. This may require restructuring concurrent and consecutive terms even where the individual offence categories and guilty-plea credit are sound. Offences closely connected in time may properly attract concurrent terms, while later or distinct offending may justify consecutive terms. The Court of Appeal reduced the appellants’ aggregate sentences and adjusted their driving disqualifications accordingly.

Daniel Lloyd and Layton Doran appealed with leave against sentences imposed by HHJ Martin Hurst in the Crown Court at Derby on 13 January 2025. Lloyd had pleaded guilty to burglary of a dwelling, two attempted burglaries and dangerous driving, receiving 11 years’ imprisonment. Doran had pleaded guilty to attempted burglary and aggravated vehicle taking, receiving six years and five months’ imprisonment, together with driving disqualifications.

Both appellants argued that the sentencing judge had failed to reflect that the burglaries were attempts and had imposed excessive aggregate sentences. Doran also relied on the common factual background of the attempted burglary and aggravated vehicle taking. The central issues were the proper treatment of attempts, the application of totality, and the appropriate concurrent or consecutive structure.

The appeals against sentence succeeded to the extent set out below.

1. Attempts. The sentencing judge’s analysis and categorisation of the completed burglary on count 1 could not be faulted. However, some account had to be taken of the fact that counts 5 and 6 were attempts rather than completed offences. The seriousness of the offending did not justify treating the attempts as completed offences. The additional aggravating features concerning count 6, including the presence of a child and the substantial impact on the victim and her family, remained relevant.
2. Totality and sentence structure. The judge was correct in principle to impose concurrent sentences for counts 1 and 5, which occurred less than an hour apart, and consecutive sentences for count 6, committed later, and count 7. The credit of at least 10 per cent for Lloyd’s guilty plea was also correct. Nevertheless, the aggregate sentence imposed on each appellant was too long. Totality required a just and proportionate sentence sufficient to meet the justice of the case. In Doran’s case, the offences on counts 6 and 8 arose from the same factual background and their sentences should run concurrently.
3. Orders concerning Lloyd. The sentences on counts 5 and 6 were quashed and replaced by four years’ imprisonment on each count. Count 5 was concurrent with count 1, and count 6 was consecutive to count 1. The 12-month sentence on count 7 was ordered to run concurrently with count 6. Count 1 remained unaffected. The total sentence was therefore nine years’ imprisonment.
4. Orders concerning Doran and disqualification. The sentences on counts 6 and 8 were quashed and replaced by five years’ imprisonment on count 6, less 203 days for time spent on a qualifying curfew, and 12 months on count 8, concurrent with count 6. The total sentence was five years, less 203 days. The driving disqualification orders were quashed and remade under sections 35 A and 35B of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988. Lloyd was disqualified for six years and six months and until passing an extended driving test. Doran was disqualified for three years and 263 days.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) — In [2025] EWCA Crim 1565, both appeals against sentence succeeded to the stated extent. The sentences were quashed and replaced with reduced sentences and revised driving disqualifications.
• Crown Court at Derby — On 13 January 2025, HHJ Martin Hurst sentenced Lloyd to 11 years’ imprisonment and Doran to six years and five months’ imprisonment, together with driving disqualifications.