R v Oswald Greenaway

Under a kidnapping sentencing guideline, particularly vulnerable has a high threshold and must be assessed from all circumstances at the time of the kidnapping. Intoxication, isolation and lack of transport may cumulatively satisfy that threshold, even where the victim remains able to walk and converse. Vulnerability may increase as events unfold, but later circumstances must not be used to assess an earlier offence.

Deliberate targeting requires a causative nexus: the offender must target the victim because they appreciate the victim’s particular vulnerability. Limited planning does not preclude that finding. Where targeting is established but other culpability features are less serious, the factors may balance so that the offence falls within a middle category. Sentencing remains an evaluative exercise rather than a mechanical calculation.

This was a reference by the Attorney General under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 concerning a sentence imposed after a retrial at the Crown Court at Wood Green. The respondent had been convicted of kidnapping, sexual assault, assault occasioning actual bodily harm and possessing a bladed article, receiving an aggregate sentence of four years and three months.

The Crown argued that the kidnapping should have been placed in a higher culpability category because the victim was particularly vulnerable and had been deliberately targeted. The respondent relied on the judge’s finding of limited planning and contended that the sentence was not unduly lenient. The central questions were whether the victim was particularly vulnerable when kidnapped and whether the offender deliberately targeted her for that reason.

1. Disposition. Leave to refer the sentence was granted. The reference was allowed to the extent that the sentence on Count 1 was quashed and a sentence of five years and three months substituted. The sentences for the other offences remained unchanged.
2. Particular vulnerability. The expression has a high threshold. The assessment must consider all circumstances increasing or reducing the victim’s vulnerability. Earlier decisions, including R v Boltaev [2025] EWCA Crim 207, R v BN [2021] EWCA Crim 1250 and R v Sabato [2021] EWCA Crim 940, provide examples and points of reference rather than rigid rules.
3. Vulnerability may change during events. For a kidnapping, the relevant assessment is the victim’s condition when the kidnapping occurred. Later isolation, additional alcohol and the victim’s heightened vulnerability during the later sexual assault could not determine the assessment of the kidnapping.
4. Deliberate targeting. This requires a causative nexus between appreciating the victim’s particular vulnerability and deciding to target her. The threshold is high. Limited planning does not prevent such a finding. The requirement was consistent with, but did not equate to, an intention at the time of kidnapping to commit a sexual offence.
5. On the facts found, the combination of intoxication, isolation and absence of transport met the high threshold. The sentencing judge’s finding that the offender knew the victim might succumb to a fraudulent offer established deliberate targeting, although this was a less serious example than the most serious cases. The kidnapping could therefore be placed in category 2B. The sentencing exercise was not mathematical: the court had to stand back and decide whether the aggregate sentence was the lowest properly available. An aggregate sentence of five years and nine months was justified.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) In [2025] EWCA Crim 1568, leave was granted on the Attorney General’s reference under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988. The sentence on Count 1 was quashed and five years and three months substituted; the reference was allowed to that extent.
• Crown Court at Wood Green Following a retrial, the respondent was convicted of kidnapping, sexual assault, assault occasioning actual bodily harm and possessing a bladed article. On 28 July 2025 the court imposed an aggregate sentence of four years and three months.