R v Steven Gain

When sentencing an offender with a mental disorder, the court should first assess culpability under the offence-specific guideline and then consider whether the disorder reduces culpability. Reduction requires a sufficient connection between the disorder and the offending. Expert evidence need not be accepted, but reasons should be given for departing from relevant opinion. Failure to refer expressly to psychiatric evidence does not necessarily invalidate a sentence where the evidence does not establish such a connection and the court’s reasoning can be inferred. Operational assistance in organised drug supply may justify a significant role, subject to adjustment for lesser-role features. Totality may require adjustment where concurrent counts concern different drugs.

R v Steven Gain was an appeal against concurrent sentences of three years and two months’ imprisonment imposed by the Crown Court at Chester for two counts of being concerned in the supply of Class A drugs. The appellant had pleaded guilty and received 20 per cent credit.

The offending formed part of a county lines operation. The appellant was a street dealer and had also performed operational tasks, including arranging taxis. Psychiatric evidence confirmed severe, treatment-resistant schizophrenia and substance dependencies, but did not directly address whether his illness caused or reduced his responsibility for the offending.

The central issues were whether the appellant’s mental health required a greater reduction in culpability, whether he should have been placed in a lesser role category, and whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.

1. Appeal dismissed. The notional sentence of four years’ imprisonment before credit for plea was not manifestly excessive. It fell within the available range for the offending.
2. The sentencing approach for an offender with a mental disorder required an initial assessment under the offence-specific guideline, followed by consideration of whether the disorder reduced culpability. That reduction depended on a sufficient connection between the disorder and the offending. Although the Recorder should have followed that structured approach and referred expressly to the psychiatric report, the omission did not make the sentence unsafe.
3. The psychiatric report described psychotic symptoms and their possible effects on judgment in general terms. It did not specifically address whether the appellant’s illness affected his responsibility for the offences. The report therefore did not provide an expert opinion on causation from which the Recorder had departed. The pre-sentence report also indicated that, although others may have exploited the appellant, he had chosen to become involved. It was permissible to infer that the Recorder considered that his culpability was not significantly reduced by his mental health difficulties.
4. The appellant’s participation went beyond street dealing. He performed operational functions for an organised criminal group and had some awareness of the scale of its activity. The Recorder was entitled to place him in a significant role. A downward adjustment was nevertheless available, and had been made, to reflect his vulnerability, exploitation by others and the short duration of his involvement.
5. Even if the notional sentence for one offence should have been reduced to about three years and nine months, totality required consideration of the two counts involving different Class A drugs. In that context, a four-year sentence before credit could be regarded as generous. The concurrent sentences therefore stood.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): R v Steven Gain, [2025] EWCA Crim 1692; appeal against sentence dismissed.
• Crown Court at Chester: concurrent sentences of three years and two months’ imprisonment imposed for two counts of being concerned in the supply of Class A drugs. The sentence on the second count was subsequently rectified at a slip-rule hearing.