R v Andrew Nathaniel Skeene & Anor

In a conspiracy to defraud indictment, the essential offence is the dishonest agreement to deprive identified victims of something to which they are or might be entitled, or to injure a proprietary right. The prosecution must state that offence and provide particulars sufficient to identify the case to be met. Particulars describing the means by which the conspiracy was carried out do not become essential elements merely because they are detailed or numerous. The jury must be unanimous about the essential agreement, but need not unanimously agree on a particular means unless the indictment makes that means part of the agreement alleged. The indictment and directions must be read as a whole. A full direction on dishonesty is not routinely required where the issue is not genuinely raised.

Andrew Nathaniel Skeene and Junie Conrad Omari Bowers renewed applications for permission to appeal their convictions and sentences following a trial at Southwark Crown Court. They had been convicted of three conspiracies to defraud investors in teak plantation schemes and of misconduct in the course of winding up a company. Each received an aggregate sentence of 11 years’ imprisonment.

The principal conviction issue was whether the conspiracy counts failed to identify the essential agreement and whether the jury had to agree unanimously on one or more of the numbered means alleged. Further grounds concerned the summing-up, dishonesty directions and evidence from a forestry consultant. The sentence applications concerned the asserted value of teak trees remaining on the land.

1. Conviction ground 1. Leave was granted on the challenge to the indictment, but the appeal was dismissed. Under section 3 of the Indictments Act 1915 and rule 10.2(1) of the Criminal Procedure Rules 2020, an indictment must state the specific offence and provide particulars making clear the conduct alleged. Those functions remain distinct.
2. For conspiracy to defraud, the essential agreement is an agreement dishonestly to defraud the identified victims. The means by which that agreement is implemented may be developed later and need not be agreed in detail at the outset. The jury must be unanimous on the essential agreement.
3. The numbered particulars described the means relied on to prove and manifest the conspiracies. They gave reasonable information about the prosecution case and prevented the prosecution shifting its ground without amendment. They were not essential elements, so unanimity on any particular numbered allegation was unnecessary. The legal directions, route to verdict and oral summing-up, read together, adequately explained that distinction.
4. The court treated Scott v Metropolitan Police Commissioner, R v Landy and R v Hancock as supporting the distinction between the dishonest agreement and particulars of its means. R v K was explained: its observations about future drafting were dicta, while its essential approach remained consistent with Landy and Hancock.
5. The challenges to the summing-up, the absence of a fuller direction reflecting Ivey v Genting Casinos (UK) (trading as Crockfords Club) and R v Barton, and the admission of the forestry consultant’s evidence were unarguable or unsupported. Permission on those grounds was refused.
6. Permission to appeal sentence was refused. The asserted future value of teak trees was speculative and could not materially reduce the losses or the seriousness of the offences. The aggregate sentence of 11 years was within the proper sentencing range.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): R v Andrew Nathaniel Skeene & Anor [2025] EWCA Crim 17. Leave was granted on the indictment ground but the conviction appeal was dismissed. Permission was refused on the remaining conviction grounds and on sentence.
• Single Judge: permission was refused on 9 December 2022. The applications were renewed.
• Southwark Crown Court: the appellants were convicted on 31 May 2022 and sentenced on 15 June 2022 by HHJ Pegden KC to an aggregate 11 years’ imprisonment each.