R v Frederick Rogers

On an appeal against sentence for causing death by dangerous driving, a category A starting point under the current Definitive Sentencing Guideline may be appropriate where offending combines deliberate disregard of road rules, very excessive speed and serious alcohol and drug impairment. Such driving is not reduced to a split-second or isolated lapse merely because the collision followed a single decision. Dangerous driving by another driver does not excuse the appellant or provide substantial mitigation. The sentencing judge need not expressly mention delay if the sentence structure shows that it has been adequately allowed for. Post-sentence progress does not demonstrate that the sentence was manifestly excessive when imposed.

The appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) against a sentence of 10 years’ imprisonment for causing death by dangerous driving. In June 2021 he drove at very high speed through a red traffic light while impaired by alcohol and cannabis. His vehicle collided with another car, causing the death of a passenger.

The Crown Court at Wolverhampton applied the current Definitive Sentencing Guideline, placed the offending in category A, adopted a 12-year sentence after trial and allowed 15 per cent credit for the guilty plea. The appeal challenged the starting point, the treatment of mitigation, the other driver’s conduct and charging delay. The central issue was whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.

1. Appeal dismissed. The Court of Appeal upheld the sentence of 10 years’ imprisonment.
2. The appellant correctly accepted that the current Definitive Sentencing Guideline applied. The sentencing judge was entitled to place the offending in category A. The relevant features were the deliberate disregard of road rules and the risk to others, driving at almost twice the speed limit, and driving while approaching highly impaired through alcohol and cannabis.
3. The starting point of 12 years after trial was not excessive. Driving for a period at 56 to 61 miles per hour while significantly intoxicated, culminating in crossing a red light, could not properly be characterised as a split-second decision or an isolated incident.
4. The judge had taken the mitigating features into account, including the appellant’s lack of relevant convictions, remorse, assistance at the scene, caring responsibilities and the involvement of the other driver. The other driver’s dangerous conduct neither excused the appellant’s dangerous driving nor afforded mitigation of substantial weight.
5. Although the judge did not refer expressly to the 14-month delay in charging, the structure of the sentencing remarks showed that the judge had considered the mitigation. Rounding down the guilty-plea reduction was more than sufficient to accommodate any mitigation arising from the delay, assuming that the delay could have that effect.
6. The appellant’s progress in custody could not affect whether the sentence was manifestly excessive when imposed. The judge had also been entitled to treat a later conviction for drug-impaired driving as significantly aggravating, but had benignly chosen not to do so.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) — appeal against sentence dismissed: [2025] EWCA Crim 1717.
• Crown Court at Wolverhampton — HHJ Chambers imposed 10 years’ imprisonment for causing death by dangerous driving.