R v Andrew Thomas

An acquittal on one count does not necessarily make a conviction on another count arising from the same events unsafe. Verdicts are not inconsistent where the counts have different legal ingredients. Aggravated burglary required proof that the defendant knew participants possessed weapons, whereas conspiracy to commit robbery required proof that he agreed that force would be used or threatened to steal. A jury could therefore acquit on aggravated burglary but convict on conspiracy. Knowledge of intended force may be inferred from surrounding circumstances, including the defendant’s role in facilitating the enterprise, his travel with the participants and their communications. Where accurate directions separate the ingredients and the verdicts are explicable on the evidence, the conviction is neither perverse nor unsafe.

The appellant pleaded guilty to dangerous driving and was tried at the Crown Court at Nottingham on charges of aggravated burglary and conspiracy to commit robbery arising from a break-in at a domestic cannabis factory. The jury acquitted him of aggravated burglary but convicted him of conspiracy to commit robbery. He was sentenced to three years and six months’ imprisonment for the conspiracy, with a concurrent six-month sentence for dangerous driving.

With leave, he appealed against conviction. He argued that the acquittal showed that the jury had rejected his knowledge of the criminal plan and weapons, making the conviction for conspiracy inconsistent and perverse. He also argued that there was insufficient evidence from which the jury could infer knowledge that force would be used or threatened. The central issue was whether the two verdicts could properly coexist.

1. Appeal dismissed. The jury’s acquittal on aggravated burglary did not logically undermine its conviction for conspiracy to commit robbery. Although both counts arose from the same events, their legal ingredients were materially different.
2. For aggravated burglary, the route to verdict required the jury to be sure that the appellant knew that the people whom he intentionally assisted or encouraged possessed weapons of offence. For the conspiracy count, the jury had to be sure that, when he drove to Birding Street, he had agreed with the others that force would be used to steal the cannabis, intending that he or they would carry out the plan.
3. The jury could rationally have been sure that the appellant agreed to a robbery involving force, while remaining unsure that he knew the participants possessed weapons. The verdicts were therefore not inconsistent, perverse or inexplicable.
4. The jury was also entitled to draw legitimate inferences about the appellant’s knowledge from the circumstances. Relevant matters included his driving from London to the scene with participants in the enterprise and the communications between them during the journey. Those matters, together with the other evidence, provided ample material for the jury to infer the requisite knowledge and agreement.
5. The judge’s written and oral directions accurately distinguished the counts and required the jury to consider them separately. The conviction was safe.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) — [2025] EWCA Crim 1755, 18 December 2025: appeal against conviction dismissed.
• Crown Court at Nottingham — the appellant was acquitted of aggravated burglary, convicted of conspiracy to commit robbery, and sentenced to three years and six months’ imprisonment on that count, with a concurrent six-month sentence for dangerous driving.