R v Clive Thomas Leonard

In sentencing for multiple serious offences, the principle of totality requires the overall sentence to reflect the total criminality. That may be achieved through concurrent or consecutive sentences, with a reduction assessed in the circumstances of the case. The sentencing judge’s direct assessment of the evidence and criminality is entitled to weight on appeal. An argument that the evidence could have supported reasonable belief in consent cannot undermine the jury’s rejection of that explanation. A sentence will stand where it is neither manifestly excessive nor wrong in principle.

The appellant was convicted after trial at the Crown Court at Swansea of two counts of rape and sentenced to concurrent terms of 12 years’ imprisonment. The sentencing judge had assessed the offences under category 3B of the Sentencing Guidelines and imposed concurrent sentences to reflect totality.

Permission to appeal was granted principally on the issue whether the reduction for totality was sufficient. The appellant also argued that his culpability was substantially reduced because the facts allegedly came close to establishing reasonable belief in consent. The central issues were whether the sentence was excessive or contrary to principle and whether the judge had properly applied totality.

1. Appeal dismissed. The sentence of 12 years’ imprisonment was neither manifestly excessive nor wrong in principle. The surcharge order was amended from £228 to the correct sum of £190.
2. The sentencing judge had properly applied the Sentencing Guidelines. The offences were assessed as category 3B, with starting points of five years and a range of four to seven years. The court observed that aspects of the victims’ vulnerability and the impact of the offences might have supported a more serious categorisation.
3. The totality principle required the sentence to reflect the overall criminality of both offences. The judge had to impose either consecutive or concurrent sentences. The concurrent structure and the reduction made for totality were reasonable in the circumstances and did not require a further reduction merely because the offences were similar.
4. The sentencing judge had heard the evidence and formed a direct view of the complainants. That assessment was relevant to the sentencing exercise. Although the appellant argued that his evidence could have supported reasonable belief in consent, the jury had rejected that explanation. The appellate court was required to do justice to the verdicts and could not sentence on the basis of an alternative explanation inconsistent with them.
5. The overall sentence was merited by two serious offences, the vulnerability of the victims through drink and personal circumstances, and the devastating emotional impact described in their victim personal statements.

The reporting restriction under section 3 of Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992 was noted as applying to the case.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): The appeal against sentence was dismissed. The surcharge order was amended to £190: [2025] EWCA Crim 1796.
• Crown Court at Swansea: Following trial, the appellant was convicted of two counts of rape and sentenced to concurrent terms of 12 years’ imprisonment.