R v YDW

In an appeal against sentence, the Court of Appeal asks whether the sentence imposed below was manifestly excessive; it does not re-sentence merely because circumstances have changed after sentence. The totality principle requires the sentence to be assessed as a whole, including the relationship between concurrent and consecutive terms. Advanced age, ill-health, good character and the passage of time remain relevant, but may carry limited weight where the offending is very serious and prolonged. A sentencing error that benefited the offender cannot be corrected on appeal if doing so would make the sentence more severe, by virtue of Criminal Appeal Act 1968, section 11(3). Where historical offending spans different sentencing regimes, the applicable regime must be identified by reference to when the offending occurred, with ambiguity resolved in the offender’s favour.

Following a trial in the Crown Court at Lincoln, the appellant was convicted of seven counts of indecent assault contrary to section 14(1) of the Sexual Offences Act 1956, arising from sexual offending against a child between 1985 and 1995. The Recorder imposed a total sentence of 12 years’ imprisonment: four years and six months for counts 1 to 6, concurrent, and seven years and six months consecutively for count 7. The appellant appealed against sentence, arguing that the totality principle and mitigation had been insufficiently applied and that the sentence on count 7 was excessive. The appeal also raised the consequences of the Recorder’s mistaken view of the historical maximum sentence and the apparent imposition of a victim surcharge.

1. Appeal dismissed. The total sentence of 12 years’ imprisonment was not manifestly excessive. The Court accepted that a lengthy custodial sentence was inevitable for a prolonged course of serious sexual offending against a vulnerable child, occurring over about ten years and producing substantial, lasting psychological harm.
2. The appellate question was whether the sentence imposed below was manifestly excessive. The Court declined to adjourn for a further medical report because the appellant’s post-sentence deterioration could not assist in deciding whether the sentence was excessive when imposed. His stroke nevertheless underlined the relevance of his advanced age and poor health.
3. The sentencing judge had been well placed to assess seriousness. He had taken account of age, ill-health and good character. Those matters remained relevant, but could not materially detract from the seriousness of the offending. Good character was of reduced relevance given the gravity of the offences.
4. The sentence of seven years and six months for count 7 was not manifestly excessive. The offence involved the appellant masturbating in front of the victim, causing her to kiss his penis, and then partially penetrating her mouth. Its seriousness justified treating it as qualitatively different from the conduct in the other counts.
5. The Recorder had properly applied totality by making counts 1 to 6 concurrent and count 7 consecutive, while considering the overall sentence as a whole.
6. The Recorder had wrongly proceeded on the basis that the maximum sentence for counts 1 to 3 was five years. The offending straddled regimes under which the maximum was five years before 15 September 1985 and ten years thereafter. The sentencing court should have determined when each count’s offending occurred and resolved ambiguity in the appellant’s favour. Since the error benefited the appellant, Criminal Appeal Act 1968, section 11(3), prevented the Court from adopting a more severe approach.
7. No victim surcharge should have been imposed because the earliest offending pre-dated the victim surcharge provisions.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): [2025] EWCA Crim 1818. Appeal against the total sentence dismissed. The Court also confirmed that no victim surcharge should have been imposed.
• Crown Court at Lincoln: The appellant was convicted on 5 August 2025 and sentenced on 26 September 2025 to 12 years’ imprisonment. The Recorder imposed four years and six months on counts 1 to 6 concurrently, followed consecutively by seven years and six months on count 7.