R v Anthony Jones

Serious Crime Act 2015, section 75A creates one offence of non-fatal strangulation or suffocation. It may be committed either by intentionally strangling another person or by committing a battery that affects that person’s ability to breathe.

An indictment alleging intentional strangulation may support conviction by either statutory route where the evidence justifies it and the accused suffers no unfairness. Jurors will ordinarily not need to agree on the precise statutory route, provided the necessary jury majority is sure that conduct within section 75A(1) occurred. Strangulation includes compression of the neck; suffocation means interference with breathing by other means.

The appellant was tried at the Crown Court at Ipswich on offences against two complainants. The indictment included two counts of intentional strangulation under section 75A(1)(a) of the Serious Crime Act 2015.

The trial judge directed the jury that intentional force affecting a complainant’s ability to breathe would prove the offence. During its retirement, the jury asked whether force applied to the chest fell within strangulation. The judge directed it to decide whether it was sure that the appellant intentionally applied force affecting the complainant’s ability to breathe, while stressing that the evidence concerned force to the neck.

The jury convicted the appellant. He appealed the convictions for intentional strangulation, contending that section 75A creates two distinct offences and that the jury had been directed on an uncharged suffocation offence.

1. Appeal dismissed. The convictions on counts 2 and 6 were safe. The judge made no error of law and her final direction caused the appellant no unfairness.

2. Section 75A of the Serious Crime Act 2015 creates a single offence of non-fatal strangulation or suffocation. Section 75A(1)(a) and (b) specify alternative ways of committing that offence. The difference that intentional strangulation requires specific intent, while the alternative battery may be committed recklessly, does not create two offences. Section 75B, referring to conduct that would constitute an offence under section 75A, supports that construction.

3. The court agreed with and endorsed R v Hughes [2024] EWCA Crim 593. Although the particulars alleged intentional strangulation, the jury could, if the evidence justified it and there was no unfairness, convict by the alternative route in section 75A(1)(b). The suggested future form of particulars was intentional strangulation, or intentional strangulation or suffocation, contrary to section 75A(1).

4. Strangulation includes compression of the victim’s neck, whether by a hand, ligature, body part or object. Suffocation refers to actual interference with breathing by means other than neck compression. No comprehensive definition was required.

5. Jurors will only exceptionally need to agree on the precise route by which conduct amounted to strangulation or suffocation. The exceptional circumstances are those discussed in R v Chilvers [2021] EWCA Crim 1311, and did not arise here. The evidence consistently alleged intentional force to each complainant’s neck, rather than pressure to the chest or another distinct act.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) Dismissed the appeal against the convictions for intentional strangulation: [2025] EWCA Crim 195.
• Crown Court at Ipswich The appellant was convicted by a jury of the relevant offences and sentenced to a total of four years’ imprisonment.