R v Grant Bradley

On an Attorney General’s Reference, a sentence is unduly lenient only if it falls outside the range that the sentencing judge could reasonably consider appropriate. The Court of Appeal must grant leave only in exceptional circumstances and not in borderline cases. Even where a sentence is unduly lenient, the court retains a discretion whether to increase it. That discretion is fact-sensitive and may take account of a sentencing indication, prosecutorial conduct, delay, subsequent compliance, rehabilitation, and the consequences of renewed custody. A suspended sentence is a custodial sentence and cannot be imposed where the proper sentence, after applying appropriate credit, remains above the maximum term permitted for suspension. However, an error does not require resentencing where, in the particular circumstances, increasing the sentence would be unjust.

The Solicitor General referred to the Court of Appeal under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, contending that a sentence imposed by the Crown Court at Derby was unduly lenient. The respondent had pleaded guilty to wounding with intent, contrary to section 18 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, after a prolonged prosecution and had received 24 months’ imprisonment suspended for 18 months, with an unpaid work requirement.

The challenge concerned the categorisation of culpability, the effect of mitigation and delay, and the decision to suspend the sentence. The central questions were whether leave should be granted, whether the sentence was unduly lenient, and, if so, whether the court should exercise its discretion to increase it.

1. The court granted leave under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988. The respondent’s attack was serious, and the law could not condone taking the law into one’s own hands, even where an offender believed that a relative had been the subject of an offence.
2. The principles summarised in Attorney-General’s Reference (Egan) [2022] EWCA Crim 1751; [2023] 2 Cr App R (S) 60 applied. The first-instance judge is well placed to assess competing sentencing factors. A sentence is unduly lenient only where it falls outside the range reasonably open to that judge. Leave is exceptional and is not granted in borderline cases.
3. Even accepting the categorisation as category B3, the notional sentence could not properly have been reduced below three years. After credit for the guilty plea, it could not have been reduced sufficiently to permit suspension. The sentencing indication had also been given without full compliance with the procedures required by Goodyear [2005] EWCA Crim 888; [2005] 1 WLR 2532.
4. Following Attorney-General’s Reference (No 4 of 1989) (1990) 90 Cr App R 366, the court retained a discretion whether to increase a sentence even after finding it unduly lenient. The discretion was not governed by absolute rules. The court could consider the circumstances of the sentencing process, including the prosecution’s conduct, and the effects of double jeopardy, as discussed in Attorney-General’s Reference (Egan).
5. In the particular circumstances, it would not be right to increase the sentence. Relevant considerations included the sentencing indication, the prosecution’s failure to demur or mention a possible Reference, the delay before charge, the respondent’s subsequent good conduct, his acceptance of wrongdoing, compliance with the suspended sentence order, employment, and the impact of immediate custody on his family and finances.
6. The Reference was refused and the Crown Court sentence was left undisturbed.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) [2025] EWCA Crim 234: leave was granted under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, but the Reference was refused and the sentence was not increased.
• Crown Court at Derby: the respondent pleaded guilty to wounding with intent and was sentenced on 13 December 2024 to 24 months’ imprisonment suspended for 18 months, with 180 hours’ unpaid work.