R v AIZ

Sentencing an adult for sexual offences committed as a child requires a structured two-stage assessment under the applicable child sentencing guidelines. The court must assess the offending and likely sentence at the time, then decide whether later events and sentencing purposes justify a more severe sentence. Later conduct and consequences may illuminate original culpability and harm, but cannot justify treating the offender as an adult for childhood conduct. If the evidence does not establish that a specific offence occurred at the older age relied on, sentencing must proceed on the younger age supported by the evidence. A materially inflated sentence may be manifestly excessive and substituted on appeal.

The appellant, aged 31, appealed with leave against a sentence imposed at the Crown Court at Reading on 24 April 2024. He had been convicted or had pleaded guilty to seven sexual offences against his stepsister, committed when he was aged between 11 and 15. The sentencing judge applied the Sentencing Children and Young People Guideline and imposed a total sentence of five years' imprisonment.

The grounds included alleged misapplication of the principles in R v Ahmed and Others [2023] EWCA Crim 281, insufficient reduction for youth, improper distinction of the case of RW, and an unsupported finding that the most serious offence occurred when the appellant was 15. The central issues were the proper approach to sentencing an adult for childhood offending and the evidential basis for determining his age when the specific offence occurred.

Appeal allowed in part. The sentencing judge’s structured approach was correct, but the sentence was manifestly excessive because the most serious offence had been sentenced on an evidentially unsupported assumption about the appellant’s age.

1. The applicable child sentencing guidelines had to be followed unless contrary to the interests of justice. The approach in R v Ahmed and Others [2023] EWCA Crim 281 required the court first to assess the offending under the child guideline and then to consider whether there was good reason, having regard to later events and the purposes of sentencing under section 57 of the Sentencing Code, to impose a sentence more severe than would likely have been imposed shortly after the offending.
2. Subsequent events could assist the court in identifying the true level of culpability at the time of the offending and the extent of the harm caused. The appellant’s later manipulation, concealment and minimisation illuminated the coercive nature of his conduct. This did not amount to sentencing him as an adult for offences committed when he was a child.
3. The comparison with RW did not require the same sentence. There were material differences in the ages at which the offending began and ended, its duration and pattern, the appellant’s continued denial of the most serious offences, the pleas, and the available mitigation.
4. The evidence did not establish to the criminal standard that the oral rape occurred when the appellant was 15. Most offending occurred before his fifteenth birthday, and the incidents appeared to have tailed off towards the end. The sentence therefore had to proceed on the basis that he was 14, materially reducing culpability.
5. The sentence for count 1 was quashed and replaced with three years and six months’ imprisonment. The sentences for counts 3 and 4 were quashed and replaced with three years, concurrent with each other and count 1. The remaining sentences were unchanged and concurrent. The appeal was allowed to that extent.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) — [2025] EWCA Crim 349. The appeal against sentence was allowed in part. The Crown Court sentences for counts 1, 3 and 4 were quashed and substituted as set out in the judgment.
• Crown Court at Reading — On 24 April 2024, the appellant was sentenced to a total of five years’ imprisonment for seven sexual offences committed during childhood.