R v Oscar Castano-Coloque

When a statutory starting point already reflects an aggravating feature, a sentencing judge may still identify additional aggravation arising from the particular circumstances of the offending, provided the same factor is not counted twice. Premeditation, the location and public danger of an attack, previous convictions, and attempted concealment may justify an increase above the statutory starting point. Youth, difficult upbringing, remorse and absence of an intention to kill remain relevant mitigation. Mental disorder reduces culpability only where there is a sufficient connection between the impairment and the offending; otherwise it may still bear on mitigation. An appellate court may uphold the sentencing approach but quash a minimum term that is manifestly excessive in the overall balancing exercise.

The appellant pleaded guilty to murder in the Crown Court at Croydon and was sentenced to life imprisonment with a minimum term of 25 years and six months, less 355 days spent on remand. He also received a concurrent two-year sentence for possession of a bladed article. The sentencing judge applied the statutory 25-year starting point because the appellant had taken a knife to the scene, increased it to 27 years for aggravating features, and allowed five per cent credit for the guilty plea.

He appealed against sentence, arguing that the aggravation had been double counted and that insufficient weight had been given to mitigation, including youth, difficult upbringing, mental disorder, remorse and the absence of an intention to kill. The central issue was whether the sentencing approach or resulting minimum term was manifestly excessive.

1. Appeal allowed in part. The court quashed the minimum term of 27 years before credit for plea and substituted a minimum term of 24 years, less 355 days spent on remand. All other aspects of the sentence remained unchanged.
2. The statutory starting point of 25 years, under sections 321 and 322 and paragraph 4 of Schedule 1 to the Sentencing Act 2020, already reflected the fact that the appellant had taken a knife to the scene. It did not prevent the judge from finding further aggravation in the notably premeditated attack, the danger and likely trauma caused by the attack on the top deck of a crowded bus, the appellant's previous convictions, and his attempt to conceal the offence by discarding his jacket and knife.
3. The location of the attack was materially different from R v Benson [2017] EWCA Crim 120, which did not assist the appellant. The additional aggravating features did not amount to impermissible double counting.
4. The judge had taken into account the relevant mitigation: the appellant's youth, difficult upbringing, lack of life chances, belated remorse and lack of an intention to kill. The psychiatric evidence showed that he understood what he was doing and intended to inflict substantial harm. Accordingly, the Sentencing Council guideline concerning mental disorder did not apply to reduce culpability because no sufficient connection between impairment and offending had been established. The evidence nevertheless formed part of the mitigation.
5. The appellant's youth remained relevant, including in light of his childhood experiences. The court accepted that maturity is a flexible concept, as illustrated by R v Clarke [2018] EWCA Crim 185, but the sentencing judge had reflected youth in the sentence.
6. Although the sentencing approach was correct, the resulting 27-year notional minimum was manifestly excessive when aggravation and mitigation were considered together. The aggravating factors justified an increase to around 27 years, but the mitigation brought the appropriate figure to between 25 and 26 years before credit for plea. The substituted term was therefore 24 years after approximately five per cent credit.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): In [2025] EWCA Crim 36, the appeal against sentence was allowed to the extent that the minimum term was quashed and replaced with 24 years, less 355 days spent on remand. The remaining aspects of the sentence were unchanged.
• Crown Court at Croydon: On 22 February 2024, the appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment with a minimum term of 25 years and six months, less 355 days spent on remand, for murder. A concurrent two-year sentence was imposed for possession of a bladed article.