R v Urfan Sharif & Ors

A whole life order is a sentence of last resort, reserved for the few murder cases of exceptionally extreme gravity. The examples in Schedule 21 are not exhaustive, but a whole life order outside them will be rare. Great weight should be given to the trial judge’s overall assessment of seriousness.

After selecting a minimum-term starting point, a sentencing court may give proper weight to pre-death conduct without double counting. Absence of remorse is not an aggravating factor, although an immaterial error on that point will not justify appellate intervention. For causing or allowing a child’s death, the statute and guideline do not presume that allowing death is inherently less serious than causing it; culpability depends on the facts.

Sara Sharif died aged 10 after a prolonged campaign of severe violence, cruelty and neglect. Her father, Urfan Sharif, and stepmother, Beinash Batool, were convicted of murder. Her uncle, Faisal Malik, was convicted of causing or allowing her death contrary to section 5 of the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004.

At the Central Criminal Court, Cavanagh J imposed life sentences with minimum terms of 40 years on Sharif and 33 years on Batool, and imposed 16 years’ imprisonment on Malik. Each applied for leave to appeal against sentence. The Solicitor General also sought to refer Sharif’s sentence as unduly lenient, contending that a whole life order was required.

The central issues were whether the sentences were manifestly excessive, and whether the absence of a whole life order for Sharif was unduly lenient.

1. The Reference was dismissed and all three applications for leave to appeal against sentence were refused. The court would interfere only where a sentence was manifestly excessive, wrong in principle, or unduly lenient.

2. Sharif’s 40-year minimum term was not unduly lenient for failing to impose a whole life order. Under the Sentencing Act 2020, a whole life order is reserved for murder cases of exceptionally extreme gravity. The examples in Schedule 21 are not exhaustive, but cases outside them will rarely justify that last-resort sentence. The absence of an intention to kill, the absence of planning or premeditation to kill, and the trial judge’s advantaged assessment of the lengthy evidence supported a finite minimum term. The court applied the principles identified in R v Stewart and Others [2022] EWCA Crim 1063.

3. The sentencing judge had not impermissibly double counted. There was no bright line preventing the court, after selecting a 30-year starting point, from relying on the severity, weight and extent of the pre-death conduct to increase the minimum term. The judge had repeatedly directed himself to avoid double counting.

4. It was wrong to treat absence of remorse as an aggravating factor. That error had no material effect on either Sharif’s or Batool’s minimum term in the context of the many serious aggravating features. The judge was entitled to give limited weight to the absence of an intention to kill, and to assess Batool’s personal mitigation and her direct participation in the cruelty as he did.

5. Malik’s offending properly fell within category 1A of the relevant guideline. His extreme failure to protect Sara, his awareness of the abuse, and his failure to seek help justified that conclusion even though he did not personally inflict the injuries. Section 5 of the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004 draws no distinction between causing and allowing a child’s death. Nor does the guideline presume that allowing death is necessarily less serious than causing it. As R v Lennon [2024] EWCA Crim 719 confirms, the seriousness depends on the facts of the individual case.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) In [2025] EWCA Crim 372, the court granted leave for the Solicitor General’s Reference but dismissed it. It refused Sharif’s, Batool’s and Malik’s applications for leave to appeal against sentence.

• Central Criminal Court Following trial before Cavanagh J, Sharif and Batool were convicted of murder and Malik was convicted under section 5 of the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004. On 17 December 2024, with a technical adjustment on 23 December 2024, Sharif received life imprisonment with a 40-year minimum term, Batool life imprisonment with a 33-year minimum term, and Malik 16 years’ imprisonment.