R v Dana Carr

A sentencing court may place an offence at the cusp of adjacent culpability categories where the facts justify that evaluative judgment. The guideline categories are not sealed compartments and sentencing is not a mathematical exercise. A notional sentence may reflect the position between categories, provided that the final sentence is within the applicable framework and is not wrong in principle or manifestly excessive.

Persistent lies may be treated as aggravating without double counting where they are not among the guideline factors used to assess culpability. An appellate court will not interfere merely because the sentence is severe where the sentencing judge has properly weighed personal mitigation against the seriousness of the offending.

The appellant was convicted at Teesside Crown Court of causing cruelty to a child contrary to Children and Young Persons Act 1933, section 1(1), and of allowing the death of a child contrary to Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004, section 5. Bright J imposed concurrent sentences of six and nine years’ imprisonment, treating the latter offence as the lead offence.

The child had died after a period of mistreatment by the appellant’s partner. The appellant appealed against her nine-year sentence. She challenged the categorisation of her culpability, the notional starting point, the treatment of her lies as aggravation, and the weight given to personal mitigation. The central issue was whether the sentence was wrong in principle or manifestly excessive.

1. Appeal dismissed. The total sentence of nine years’ imprisonment was severe, but it was neither wrong in principle nor manifestly excessive.

2. The sentencing judge, having presided at the trial, was best placed to assess culpability. The seriousness of neglect of a child is a matter of judgment and evaluation for the sentencing court. The judge was entitled to treat the offending as at the cusp between high and medium culpability under the definitive guideline.

3. The guideline categories were not sealed compartments. The required sentencing exercise was not mathematical. The judge’s notional sentence of seven years and six months was within the three-to-eight-year category range for a Category 1C offence, even though the case lay between Categories B and C.

4. The judge was entitled to aggravate the sentence for the appellant’s persistent lies, including her attempts to conceal matters and blame another person. This was not double counting because lies were not an express factor in the guideline’s assessment of whether culpability fell within Category B or Category C.

5. The judge had taken account of the appellant’s age, previous good character, troubled upbringing, and other personal mitigation. The seriousness of the offending nevertheless justified the final sentence. No appellate intervention was warranted.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): dismissed the appellant’s appeal against sentence in [2025] EWCA Crim 401.
• Crown Court at Teesside: Bright J sentenced the appellant on 21 December 2023 to concurrent terms of six years for child cruelty and nine years for allowing the death of a child.