R v Stephen Hardy

A renewed application for permission to appeal against conviction and sentence will fail where the alleged disclosure breach is unsupported by the disclosed material, was not pursued before the trial judge, or rests on speculation that could have been addressed by a targeted request. A complaint that a summing-up was unbalanced cannot be established by comparing the time spent on the prosecution and defence cases. The proper question is whether the directions and presentation were fair and balanced; a judge may summarise lengthy interviews rather than read them in full. On sentence, a court may impose an uplift for numerous additional offences separately from aggravating factors supporting the lead sentence, subject to totality. An extended licence period does not require a detailed mathematical calculation. A defendant’s occupation may aggravate culpability or harm where it is relevant to the offending, but there is no special sentencing category for police officers and possible adverse treatment in prison is not mitigation.

R v Stephen Hardy concerned renewed applications for permission to appeal against convictions for multiple sexual offences, including rape, sexual assault and coercive or controlling behaviour, and against an extended sentence imposed by the Crown Court at Liverpool. The applicant challenged the admission and subsequent disclosure of bad character material, the balance of the judge’s summing-up, a six-year uplift for additional offending, a six-year extended licence period, and references to his occupation as a police officer.

The convictions followed a trial before a judge and jury. The applicant had been sentenced under section 279 of the Sentencing Act 2020 to 26 years’ custody and a six-year extended licence period. The single judge refused permission. The central issues were whether the conviction complaints disclosed an arguable unfairness and whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.

1. Conviction. The renewed application for permission to appeal against conviction was refused. The bad character ruling itself was no longer challenged. The Crown had disclosed material from the earlier investigation, including about 30 categories of documentation, and the alleged failure to investigate or disclose material from a mobile telephone was speculative. The applicant had not made a targeted request under section 8 of the Criminal Procedure Investigations Act 1996, nor raised any unresolved disclosure issue with the trial judge. The absence of charges arising from the earlier allegations, and favourable messages, had been available to the defence and could be put before the jury.
2. A summing-up is not shown to be unfair by a comparison of the time spent on each side. The relevant question is whether the legal directions, evidential presentation and treatment of the defence were balanced and comprehensive. A judge may summarise lengthy and repetitive interviews and direct the jury to reread the transcripts. Here, no legal direction or material part of the defence case was identified as omitted, and the summing-up was scrupulously fair.
3. Sentence. The renewed application for permission to appeal against sentence was also refused. The 20-year term for the lead counts was justified by the minimum of five vaginal rapes and the relevant aggravating circumstances. The additional six years reflected the other numerous counts and was not double counting. The judge had properly considered totality.
4. A judge deciding the length of an extended licence period is not required to provide a detailed calculation. The period is assessed on the information available, including the offender’s dangerousness and the need for future protection, and will be upheld where it is justified by the circumstances. The applicant’s lack of previous convictions and age on release did not materially alter that assessment.
5. The applicant’s occupation as a serving police officer was legitimately relevant to culpability, harm, suppression of complaint and abuse of trust when those matters arose from the factual context. It did not create a special sentencing category. The fact that he might suffer adverse consequences in prison was not a mitigating factor. The sentence was not manifestly excessive.

1. Crown Court at Liverpool: The applicant was convicted by a judge and jury on multiple sexual and coercive-control offences and sentenced to 26 years’ custody with a six-year extended licence period under section 279 of the Sentencing Act 2020.
2. Single judge: Permission to appeal against conviction and sentence was refused.
3. Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): The renewed applications for permission to appeal were refused. See [2025] EWCA Crim 453.