R v David Allen Parsonage

For an aggravated offence involving a dangerously out-of-control dog, destruction is mandatory unless the court is satisfied that the dog would not constitute a danger to public safety. The owner bears the burden of producing evidence capable of displacing that consequence. A contingent destruction order may be appropriate where proposed controls are supported by evidence showing that they would reduce the risk to an acceptable level. A sentencing court need not investigate unsupported alternatives which the owner has neither advanced nor evidenced. Fresh evidence on appeal will not assist where it should have been adduced below and would not have altered the conclusion that the dog remained dangerous.

The applicant pleaded guilty in the Crown Court at Gloucester to an aggravated offence under section 3(1) of the Dangerous Dogs Act 1981, after his dog, Rocco, bit a woman in a public place. The judge imposed a community order, ordered Rocco's destruction and disqualified the applicant from having custody of a dog for five years.

The applicant appealed against the destruction order. He contended that a contingent destruction order should have been made, including on the basis that Rocco could be rehomed with his sister. He also applied to adduce fresh evidence from his sister and two dog legislation officers. The central issues were whether the sentencing judge was obliged to consider an unsupported contingent order and whether the new material justified allowing the appeal.

1. Appeal dismissed; application to adduce fresh evidence refused. The sentencing judge was entitled to make an immediate destruction order. Rocco had bitten two people and attacked another dog, while the applicant had repeatedly failed to control him and lacked insight into the danger he presented.

2. Under section 4 of the Dangerous Dogs Act 1981, destruction was mandatory for this aggravated offence unless the court was satisfied that Rocco would not constitute a danger to public safety. The applicant bore the burden of displacing that consequence. There was no evidence before the judge capable of doing so.

3. The Court explained that R v Flack [2008] EWCA Crim 204 did not oblige a court to devise or investigate a contingent destruction order where the owner had advanced no alternative and supplied no supporting evidence. A contingent order had not been sought at sentence, despite the judge having raised the possibility months earlier. The criminal process was not a negotiation in which an unsuccessful owner could later present an unprepared alternative on appeal.

4. The proposed fresh evidence was either evidence which could and should have been adduced below, or was incapable of showing that Rocco would cease to present an unacceptable public-safety risk. The applicant had not clearly offered to transfer ownership, remove himself from control of the dog, or comply with evidenced conditions that would reduce the risk to an acceptable level.

5. Obiter, the Court considered section 4A(1) of the Dangerous Dogs Act 1981 badly drafted. It should not be read as imposing an unexplained mandatory destruction consequence for an aggravated section 3(1) offence where no order had been made under section 4. The Court said that the reference to section 3(1) required legislative amendment.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): Dismissed the appeal against the destruction order and refused the application to adduce fresh evidence: [2025] EWCA Crim 456.
• Crown Court at Gloucester: On 26 February 2024, imposed a 12-month community order, made a dog destruction order and disqualified the applicant from having custody of a dog for five years following his guilty plea.