R v Zia Akbar

Where multiple deaths are caused by dangerous driving and charged separately, concurrent sentences may be imposed, provided that the overall sentence reflects the total criminality. The court must respect the statutory maximum applicable to the offence, even where a later sentencing guideline reflects an increased maximum. Strong personal mitigation may justify a substantial reduction, but guilty plea credit should reflect the effect of a Newton hearing. Where an offender’s account is rejected, the reduction will normally be halved and may be reduced further if witnesses were called; any departure should be explained. An appellate court need not intervene on an Attorney General’s reference where any undue leniency is marginal. An offender’s appeal will fail where the sentence is not manifestly excessive.

Mr Zia Akbar was sentenced at the Crown Court at Stafford on 9 July 2024 to concurrent terms of 8 years and 6 months’ imprisonment for two offences of causing death by dangerous driving. He was also disqualified from driving.

The Attorney General applied under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 for leave to refer the sentence as unduly lenient. Mr Akbar appealed on the basis that the sentence was manifestly excessive or wrong in principle. The central issues were the proper assessment of the sentence for two deaths, the weight given to personal mitigation, and the reduction for guilty pleas following a Newton hearing.

1. Applicable sentencing framework. The court held that the current guideline applied because sentence was passed after 1 July 2023, but the statutory maximum applicable to the offences, committed before the increase to life imprisonment, remained 14 years. The judge was therefore required to operate within that maximum.
2. Starting point and totality. The judge was entitled to treat the offending as category A because Mr Akbar had consciously accelerated to approximately twice the speed limit and was aware of the grossly excessive speed. Although the guideline starting point for a single offence was 12 years, settling on a notional 10-year sentence was rational and justifiable in the circumstances. Concurrent sentences for the two deaths were appropriate. The increase to a figure close to the statutory maximum properly reflected the overall criminality.
3. Personal mitigation. Mr Akbar’s good character, remorse, mental health difficulties and injuries provided strong mitigation. Nevertheless, a four-year reduction was generous and stretched the limits of what could properly be allowed, although the excess was marginal.
4. Guilty plea credit. The guideline on reduction for guilty pleas, paragraph F2, indicated that the available reduction should normally be halved where the offender’s account was rejected at a Newton hearing, with a possible further reduction where witnesses were called. The judge gave 15 per cent credit but did not explain why she departed from the apparent 10 per cent outcome. That omission supported the Attorney General’s submission that the sentence was lenient.
5. The resulting leniency was nevertheless marginal and did not justify intervention. Leave was granted for the Attorney General’s Reference, but the Reference was dismissed. Mr Akbar’s appeal against sentence was dismissed as the sentence was not manifestly excessive.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): In [2025] EWCA Crim 461, leave was granted for the Attorney General’s Reference but the Reference was dismissed. Mr Akbar’s appeal against sentence was also dismissed.
• Crown Court at Stafford: On 9 July 2024, HHJ Kristina Montgomery KC imposed concurrent sentences of 8 years and 6 months’ imprisonment for two offences of causing death by dangerous driving and disqualified Mr Akbar from driving.