R v Ramyran Gaiziunas

Where a conviction relied on as bad character evidence is later quashed, convictions in the later trial do not automatically become unsafe. The appellate court must assess whether the fresh evidence shows that the later convictions are unsafe. Relevant considerations include the purpose for which the evidence was admitted, the directions given to the jury, the strength of the remaining prosecution case, and whether the defendant would in any event have lacked entitlement to a full good character direction. A conviction remains safe where the jury’s verdict depended principally on the credibility of the complainant, the bad character evidence was admitted only to counter a false impression created by the defendant, and the jury was properly directed as to its limited use.

Following a trial in the Crown Court at Liverpool, the appellant was convicted of four breaches of protective orders. During the trial, evidence of his conviction for possessing a bladed article was admitted under section 101(1)(f) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 after the judge ruled that the appellant had created a false impression of good character. The jury were directed on the limited use of that evidence.

The bladed-article conviction was later quashed in a separate appeal because fresh evidence raised substantial concerns about the arresting officer’s conduct. The appellant then appealed the breach convictions, arguing that the later quashing rendered them unsafe. The central issue was whether the convictions remained safe when the bad character conviction relied on at trial had subsequently been quashed.

1. Appeal dismissed. The convictions for the four breaches remained safe. The appellant’s challenge was properly treated as relying on fresh evidence, namely the later quashing of the bladed-article conviction, rather than alleging that the trial judge had erred when admitting the evidence.
2. The prosecution case principally turned on whether the jury were sure that the complainant was truthful and reliable. The appellant’s accounts involved substantial improbabilities, including an unknown person’s unexplained access to his LinkedIn account and messages expressed in terms consistent with what he might have said, together with coincidences and an allegation that the complainant had initiated and escalated the fourth incident.
3. The bad character evidence had been admitted only to counter a false impression which the jury could find that the appellant had deliberately created. It was not introduced as a new strand of the prosecution case. The appellant had an opportunity to address the conviction in cross-examination, and the judge gave appropriate directions that the jury must not convict wholly or mainly because of it. There was no reason to think that the jury disobeyed those directions.
4. The later quashing of the conviction did not undermine the verdicts. The jury’s verdicts showed that they accepted the complainant’s truthfulness and reliability, and the prosecution case remained strong without the impugned evidence. Further, the appellant would not in any event have been entitled to a full good character direction, since the earlier breach conviction could have been adduced to rebut the false assertion of good character and such an application would have been strong.
5. No meaningful distinction arose between the LinkedIn-message counts and the count based on the encounter near the garage. The rejection of the appellant’s account concerning the LinkedIn account would itself have severely damaged his credibility.

• Crown Court at Liverpool: The appellant was convicted of two breaches of a non-molestation order and two breaches of a restraining order after a trial before His Honour Judge Warnock. He was sentenced to two years’ imprisonment in total.
• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): The appellant obtained an extension of time and limited leave to appeal. The court held that the convictions remained safe and dismissed the appeal, [2025] EWCA Crim 541.