R v BZG & Anor (A-G's Reference: child sex offences)

On an Attorney General’s reference, the Court of Appeal held that sentencing for causing or inciting a child under 13 to engage in sexual activity must reflect the activity actually performed and the resulting harm. Extreme youth did not, on these facts, automatically require the highest harm category where the activity was limited. The approach in R v AZ [2022] EWCA Crim 620 was distinguished because it concerned rape and substantially more serious sexual activity. Joint offenders must be sentenced according to their individual culpability, motivation and mitigation. Leave was granted, but the court declined to increase either sentence.

BZG and ARY were sentenced by the Central Criminal Court on 20 February 2025 for offences arising from sexual activity involving ARY’s 18-month-old child. BZG pleaded guilty and received an extended sentence. ARY was convicted after trial and received concurrent two-year suspended sentences with a mental health treatment requirement.

The Attorney General sought leave under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, arguing that the sentences were unduly lenient. The principal issue was whether the child’s extreme youth required the section 8 offences under the Sexual Offences Act 2003 to be placed in the highest harm category, and whether the judge had given proper weight to the offenders’ differing culpability and mitigation.

Disposition. The court granted leave under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 but declined to alter either sentence.

1. The Attorney General’s argument that the section 8 offences had to be treated as category 1A offences was rejected. R v AZ [2022] EWCA Crim 620 concerned rape of a two-and-a-half-year-old child, where extreme youth elevated the harm to the highest category. That approach was harder to sustain under a guideline covering sexual activity involving a child at a much lower level of gravity. The limited acts actually performed by the child—kissing his mother on the lips and smacking her bottom—were relevant to the assessment of harm.
2. ARY’s offending had to be assessed separately from BZG’s. Although the offending was joint, the judge was entitled to take account of ARY’s vulnerability, coercion and manipulation, youth, mental health, lack of previous convictions and the delay before sentence. The resulting two-year sentence, suspended with a mental health treatment requirement, was a humane and properly calibrated decision which placed the child’s interests at its centre.
3. BZG was a dangerous, predatory and manipulative offender with a sexual interest in children. His sentence had been lenient, but the nuanced assessment of harm arising from the shared acts had fairly to be carried across into his case. A longer custodial term would achieve no material protective purpose because his release was inevitable and his risk would be managed by licence and an indefinite Sexual Harm Prevention Order.
4. The decision was expressly limited to the unusual facts before the court and should not be treated as a general precedent except in identical cases.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): Leave granted to refer the sentences as unduly lenient under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988; the court declined to increase them: [2025] EWCA Crim 598.
• Central Criminal Court: HHJ Whitehouse KC sentenced BZG and ARY on 20 February 2025. BZG had pleaded guilty; ARY had been convicted after trial.