R v Paul Mingo & Anor

A jury may convict only if the prosecution has made it sure of guilt. That standard is the same as proof beyond reasonable doubt. It does not require absolute or scientific certainty, nor can it be expressed as a percentage.

Where jurors seek clarification, a supplementary direction should be brief and should return them to the requirement that they must be sure of every ingredient before convicting. A reference to the jury’s own question about being “100% sure” does not dilute the standard where the judge clearly maintains that requirement.

In sentencing an historical sexual offence, the court must follow the applicable approach to historical offending and assess the seriousness, aggravation and mitigation on the facts. An appellate court will not interfere absent an error of principle or a sentence that is manifestly excessive.

The applicants were convicted at the Crown Court at Wood Green of historical sexual offences committed against C, who was aged 15 at the time. Mingo was convicted of indecent assault contrary to section 15(1) of the Sexual Offences Act 1956. Neale was convicted of buggery contrary to section 12 of that Act.

Both applicants sought leave to appeal against conviction. Their sole ground was that, when answering a jury question about reasonable doubt and being “100% sure”, the judge had diluted the criminal standard of proof. Mingo also sought leave to appeal against his three-year sentence, contending that it was manifestly excessive for an historical offence.

The central questions were whether the supplementary direction rendered the convictions unsafe and whether the sentencing judge had erred in principle.

1. The court refused both applications for leave to appeal against conviction and Mingo’s application for leave to appeal against sentence. The convictions were safe and Mingo’s sentence was neither wrong in principle nor manifestly excessive.

2. The original direction correctly stated that the prosecution had to make the jury sure of guilt and that any doubt short of being sure had to be resolved in the defendants’ favour. The later direction did not alter that standard. Although it would have been preferable not to introduce the word “certainty”, the judge’s answer could not reasonably have conveyed that “sure” meant something less than sure.

3. When answering a jury question seeking amplification of the conventional direction, a judge should ordinarily answer shortly and focus on the requirement that the prosecution must make the jury sure before conviction. Here, the jury had itself asked whether it needed to be “100% sure”. The judge was therefore not open to fair criticism for addressing that expression, while repeatedly directing that the jury had to be sure of each ingredient of the offences.

4. The court regarded the answer as substantially consistent with directions previously approved in R v JL [2017] EWCA Crim 621 and R v Mohammad [2022] EWCA Crim 380. Those authorities confirm that absolute or scientific certainty is unnecessary and that courts should not assign percentages to the word “sure”.

5. On sentence, the judge had adopted the correct approach to historical sexual offending stated in R v H [2011] EWCA Crim 2753. She was entitled to assess the seriousness of the conduct, the victim’s harm, and the aggravating and mitigating factors. She had reflected the lower maximum sentence under section 15(1) of the Sexual Offences Act 1956, and the three-year sentence was well below the starting point for the modern equivalent offence. The applications were refused.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) — refused the applications for leave to appeal against conviction and Mingo’s application for leave to appeal against sentence: [2025] EWCA Crim 712.
• Crown Court at Wood Green — on 10 May 2024, a jury convicted Mingo of indecent assault and Neale of buggery. On 27 June 2024, Mingo was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment and Neale to an extended determinate sentence of 12 years.