R V Usman Rafiq

An appellate court may interfere with a sentence only if it was manifestly excessive or wrong in principle, assessed by reference to the circumstances when it was imposed. A later change in the offender’s personal circumstances does not establish sentencing error.

Where a driving disqualification includes an extended period, an extended period equal to half the custodial sentence is correct in principle. A substantial delay in seeking permission to appeal is not excused merely because the offender later appreciates the practical consequences of the disqualification after release.

The applicant was convicted at the Crown Court at Worcester in November 2018 of two offences of conspiracy to supply Class A drugs. He received concurrent sentences of 12 years’ imprisonment and a driving disqualification.

At a slip-rule hearing on 7 January 2019, the judge reduced the initial disqualification from three years to two years and imposed an extended disqualification period of six years. More than five years later, after serving the custodial part of the sentence, the applicant sought permission to appeal the disqualification out of time. He relied on its effect on employment and family life.

The central issues were whether the disqualification was excessive or wrong in principle when imposed, and whether there was a proper reason to extend time.

1. The court refused an extension of time and dismissed the renewed application for permission to appeal against sentence.

2. The court could interfere with the disqualification only if it was manifestly excessive or wrong in principle, judged as at the date of sentence. The applicant’s present rehabilitation, family circumstances and increased employment prospects if permitted to drive could not retrospectively make the original sentence erroneous.

3. Following the slip-rule hearing, the sentence was correct in principle. The judge had reduced the initial disqualification to two years and imposed a six-year extended period. That approach accorded with R v Needham [2016] 1 WLR 4049, which established that the extended period should be half the custodial sentence imposed.

4. Given the seriousness of the Class A drug-conspiracy offending, a two-year disqualification plus the extended period was not even arguably manifestly excessive.

5. The application was five years and five weeks late. The applicant’s failure to appreciate the effect of the disqualification until after release was understandable in human terms, but it could not amount to a proper reason for extending time. The application was therefore dismissed.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) — By judgment dated 6 February 2025, the court refused an extension of time and dismissed the renewed application for permission to appeal against sentence: [2025] EWCA Crim 751. Permission had previously been refused by a single judge.

• Crown Court at Worcester — In November 2018, the applicant was convicted of two conspiracies to supply Class A drugs and sentenced to concurrent terms of 12 years’ imprisonment. At a slip-rule hearing on 7 January 2019, the driving disqualification was adjusted to an initial period of two years with a six-year extended period.