Asad Bhatti v R

A jury may treat a defendant’s lie as strengthening the prosecution case only where it is satisfied that the lie was deliberate, concerned a material issue, and was prompted by a realisation of guilt rather than another explanation, such as bolstering a just cause, shame, or concealing disgraceful conduct. The adequacy of a lies direction depends on its practical effect and the safety of the conviction, not technical perfection.

A judge need not formulate an unclear explanation that an expertly represented defendant did not clearly advance. Directions given after speeches should ordinarily be drafted in writing and discussed with counsel before delivery.

The appellant was convicted at the Central Criminal Court of offences concerning the possession and manufacture of explosives under the Explosive Substances Act 1883, and possession for terrorist purposes under the Terrorism Act 2000. He did not dispute possession or manufacture. His case was that the materials were held for lawful experimentation, self-education, and a proposed explosives business, rather than for terrorism.

He appealed against conviction on two grounds. The first challenged the judge’s direction on lies told in police interviews. The second challenged the admission and direction concerning his failure to seek an explosives certificate. The central issue was whether those directions rendered the convictions unsafe.

1. Appeal dismissed. The convictions were safe. The evidence that the appellant had not applied for an explosives certificate was admissible. In the light of his claim that he possessed and made the materials for a lawful purpose, the jury could consider whether his failure to apply showed that he did not want the authorities to know what he was doing. The judge’s final observation effectively deprived that evidence of significance, which was more favourable than the further direction sought by the appellant.
2. The governing lies direction, derived from R v Lucas [1981] QB 720, requires the jury to be satisfied that a lie was deliberate, related to a material issue, and was motivated by a realisation of guilt rather than an innocent explanation. It guards against treating a lie as automatically proving guilt. Not every case requires every element to be spelt out where, for example, materiality is self-evident or the issue of guilt is logically central.
3. The direction given achieved that purpose. The judge told the jury to disregard the safety-interview answers unless satisfied that they were deliberate lies. The later denials of making explosives were accepted to be deliberate, plainly concerned a material issue, and were accompanied by a warning that deliberate lies may have a reason not supportive of guilt. The appellant had not clearly advanced the suggested explanation that he lied merely because he feared being wrongly regarded as a terrorist. The judge was not obliged to improve an unclear evidential case for an expertly represented defendant.
4. The court explained that a direction under section 34 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 was an available, but potentially less favourable, alternative because the lies also concealed facts later relied upon. As practice guidance, any further legal directions after speeches should ordinarily be put in writing and discussed with counsel before they are given.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division). In [2025] EWCA Crim 8, the court dismissed the appellant’s appeal against conviction.
• Central Criminal Court. Mrs Justice McGowan convicted the appellant of five explosives and terrorism-related counts and imposed an extended determinate sentence. There was no appeal against sentence.