R v Kieran Thomas Claffey & Anor

The court held that admissibility and reliability are distinct issues. A carefully reasoned ruling admitting hearsay under the Criminal Justice Act 2003 is not shown to be erroneous merely because cross-examination exposes weaknesses for the jury to assess.

• Attempting to obtain an intermediary was not misconduct connected with investigating or prosecuting the offence for bad-character purposes.
• Relevance alone did not satisfy the substantial probative value test.
• A self-defence direction requires evidence, not speculation, and may be required even if not relied upon.
• Under the Galbraith limb 1 test, a no-case submission fails where the evidence could properly support a conviction.

Following a trial at the Crown Court at Winchester, the applicants were convicted on 8 March 2024. Claffey was convicted of murder after pleading guilty to conspiracy to rob. Roach was convicted of conspiracy to rob and murder.

Roach renewed applications for leave to appeal, challenging the admission of hearsay evidence and the refusal of a no-case submission. Claffey challenged the exclusion of evidence concerning a co-defendant’s attempt to obtain an intermediary and the refusal to leave self-defence to the jury. The central questions concerned the admissibility and probative value of the evidence, the sufficiency of the prosecution case, and whether self-defence arose on the evidence.

Disposition. The renewed applications for leave to appeal were refused.

1. Hearsay. The trial judge had carefully considered the admissibility of Crystal O’Dell’s evidence under sections 114(1)(d) and 114(2) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. Defence cross-examination exposed matters capable of affecting her reliability, but reliability was for the jury. That did not establish an error in admitting the evidence.
2. No case to answer. Applying the Galbraith limb 1 test, the question was whether the prosecution case, taken at its highest, was such that a properly directed jury could not properly convict. The evidence, including the accounts of Crystal O’Dell and Julia Dickinson and evidence of association, was sufficient for the jury to assess whether Roach was present and involved. Inconsistencies and concessions in the evidence were matters for the jury.
3. Bad character. Evidence that Morgan had attempted to mislead a psychologist to obtain an intermediary was not misconduct connected with the investigation or prosecution of the offence for the purposes of section 98. It was therefore bad-character evidence. Under section 101(1)(e), relevance to Morgan’s credibility was insufficient; the evidence also needed substantial probative value. The judge was entitled to consider the other credibility evidence, the dispute between psychologists, the resulting satellite issues and Morgan’s previous convictions, and to conclude that the required probative value was absent.
4. Self-defence. A self-defence direction should be given if the defence arises on the evidence, even if no defendant relies on it and even if the defendant does not give evidence. Self-defence involves the defendant’s honest belief, while objective circumstances may assist in assessing whether that belief was genuine. An honestly held unreasonable belief may suffice, but speculation alone cannot raise the issue. The evidence did not provide a sufficient basis for the direction.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): On 19 June 2025, the renewed applications for leave to appeal were refused: [2025] EWCA Crim 852.
• Crown Court at Winchester: The applicants were convicted on 8 March 2024 following trial.