R v Rayis Nibeel & Anor

Bad-character evidence is admissible under the Criminal Justice Act 2003 where it is relevant to an important matter in issue, including the genuineness of a self-defence claim. Evidence that a defendant acquired numerous large bladed weapons may illuminate knowledge, interest, state of mind and whether a weapon was used offensively rather than defensively. Prejudice alone does not require exclusion where the evidence has real probative value and the trial is fairly managed. On a submission of no case to answer, the question is whether, taking the prosecution evidence at its highest, a properly directed reasonable jury could convict. A possible innocent interpretation of some evidence does not require withdrawal where the evidence as a whole could support guilt.

Rayis Nibeel and Umer Choudhury were convicted of murdering Omar Khan. Nibeel was also convicted of wounding Cheyanne Barnes, while Choudhury was convicted of that wounding and possession of a bladed article. Nibeel appealed against the admission of evidence that he had purchased 63 other knives, contending that it was irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial to his case of self-defence. Choudhury appealed against the refusal of his submission of no case to answer on the basis that the evidence did not support his alleged encouragement and assistance in the murder. The central issues were the admissibility and effect of the knife-purchase evidence, and whether the prosecution evidence, taken at its highest, was sufficient to leave Choudhury’s liability to the jury.

Both appeals were dismissed.

1. Nibeel: bad-character evidence. The evidence of the 63 knife purchases was properly admitted. Under sections 101(1)(d) and 103(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, the evidence was relevant to the important issue of self-defence. The quantity and character of the weapons demonstrated Nibeel’s knowledge of and interest in large, dangerous bladed weapons. That made it more likely that the knife was used offensively rather than defensively. The evidence might also have been admissible under section 101(1)(g), because Nibeel had placed the character of the deceased and Barnes in issue.
2. Fairness and safety. Although bad-character evidence was prejudicial, it was not admitted merely to bolster a weak case or prejudice the jury, applying the principle in R v Hanson [2005] EWCA Crim 824. The evidence was presented as agreed facts without photographs, Nibeel was able to explain it, and the jury was directed not to convict solely on that basis. The eyewitness evidence independently provided a strong case inconsistent with self-defence. Even if admission had been erroneous, the conviction would not have been unsafe.
3. Choudhury: no case to answer. The applicable test, derived from R v Galbraith (1981) 1 WLR 1039 and clarified in R v Goddard [2012] EWCA Crim 1756, R v Masih [2015] EWCA Crim 477 and R v Mosicki [2016] EWCA Crim 389, was whether a reasonable jury could convict on the prosecution evidence taken at its highest. In a circumstantial case, the judge does not decide weight or choose between competing inferences. The case must proceed if a properly directed reasonable jury could exclude realistic possibilities consistent with innocence.
4. Application. The evidence against Choudhury included his presence and conduct at the scene, his close association with Nibeel, their drug dealing and knife-carrying, the evidence that he directed Nibeel, his conduct after the stabbings and the cumulative circumstantial evidence. His initial words suggesting that the drugs should be handed over did not determine the issue. The later instruction to finish the attack was capable of amounting to continuing active encouragement, even though the fatal wound had already been inflicted. The evidence concerning the murder and the assault on Barnes was inextricably linked. There was therefore a case to answer on the murder as well as the assault.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): On 6 June 2025, in [2025] EWCA Crim 934, both appeals against conviction were dismissed.
• Crown Court: On 28 March 2024, both appellants were convicted. On 17 May 2024, each was ordered to be detained during His Majesty’s pleasure with a specified minimum term.