R v Jake Debonsu

Section 76(2)(b) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 concerns admissibility, although its safeguards may require a jury direction after confession evidence is admitted. A Mushtaq direction is appropriate where external oppression or improper conduct caused, or may have caused, an unreliable confession. The court doubted extending that safeguard to voluntary admissions made to friends, without pressure from a person in authority. A defendant’s choice to exaggerate to preserve street credibility does not engage the safeguard. A conviction remains safe where the confession evidence was not pivotal and other evidence independently supported guilt.

The appellant appealed against convictions for two murders following a trial before Garnham J at Inner London Crown Court. The prosecution relied partly on recorded telephone calls made by the appellant while detained on remand, in which he made admissions inconsistent with his trial defence. The calls were admitted in evidence, mostly by agreement. The judge directed the jury to assess their reliability and truth, but declined a direction requiring them to disregard any admission which might have resulted from conduct likely to render it unreliable.

With leave on a single ground, the appellant argued that a direction based on Mushtaq was required. The central issue was whether the evidence disclosed anything said or done which was likely to have rendered the admissions unreliable.

1. Appeal dismissed. The court held that the convictions were safe.
2. Section 76 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 concerns admissibility. The appeal concerned the directions required after the confession evidence had been admitted, rather than the direct application of section 76(2). Under R v Goldenberg (1989) 88 Cr App R 285, conduct relied on under section 76(2)(b) must be external to the person making the confession, causally connected with it, and likely to influence him.
3. The court applied the principle in R v Mushtaq [2005] UKHL 25 that, where the relevant threshold is met, the jury must disregard the confession if it was or may have been obtained through oppression or other conduct likely to render it unreliable, even if the jury considered it true. The authorities showed that the safeguard may extend beyond police conduct to pressure from another authority figure, as illustrated by R v Roberts [2011] EWCA Crim 2974 and R v Al-Jaryan [2020] EWCA Crim 440.
4. That threshold was not met. The appellant’s case was that he exaggerated his role to preserve street credibility and avoid being labelled a coward. That was a voluntary choice, not oppression or improper treatment. There was no evidence that he lied from fear of violence or because of pressure from a person in authority. The circumstances requiring a Mushtaq direction were therefore absent. The judge’s direction, which invited the jury to assess reliability and then truth, was adequate. R v Nudds [2008] EWCA Crim 148 and R v Minu Pham [2008] EWCA Crim 3182 were examples of cases in which such a direction was not required.
5. Alternatively, the conviction was safe. The CCTV evidence, the appellant’s admissions about the stolen vehicle and gang dispute, his history of carrying knives, and his differing accounts independently supported the prosecution case. The prison-call admissions were not pivotal because the principal matters were also addressed by the CCTV evidence. The court concluded that the outcome would have been the same even if the admissions had been disregarded.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): The appeal against conviction was dismissed and the convictions were held safe: [2025] EWCA Crim 959.
• Inner London Crown Court: Following a trial before Garnham J, the appellant was convicted by a majority of two murders and sentenced to detention during His Majesty’s Pleasure. There was no appeal against sentence.