R v ANL

A conviction for manslaughter does not, by itself, bar a retrial for murder arising from the same killing where the jury failed to agree on murder. The proposed common-law rule preventing such a retrial has no sufficient authority in that situation. Sections 6(2) and 6(3) of the Criminal Law Act 1967 provide for alternative verdicts after an acquittal, but do not govern jury disagreement on the charged offence or a separately charged lesser offence. The power recognised in R v Saunders [1988] AC 148 applies where the judge decides that manslaughter sufficiently satisfies the interests of justice and brings the proceedings to an end. Fairness concerns can be addressed by evidential rulings, severance or a stay.

Following a trial on murder and manslaughter, the jury were unable to agree on murder but returned a unanimous guilty verdict on manslaughter. The Crown Court judge discharged the jury from returning a verdict on murder and later ruled, at a preparatory hearing, that a retrial for murder was lawful.

The defendant appealed under section 35 of the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996. The central issue was whether the subsisting manslaughter conviction made a retrial for murder unlawful or an abuse of the process of the court.

Appeal dismissed. The Crown Court judge was correct to hold that a retrial for murder was lawful.

1. The Criminal Procedure Rules exist to facilitate justice. Rules 1.1 and 1.2 did not support a rule which would treat the defendant as acquitted of murder when the jury had reached no verdict on that count. The court distinguished strict legal alternatives, such as theft and handling stolen goods or murder and manslaughter, from forensic alternatives, to which the proposed rule did not apply.
2. Sections 6(2) and 6(3) of the Criminal Law Act 1967 provide a statutory route to an alternative verdict after the jury finds the defendant not guilty of the offence charged. They do not address a jury’s inability to agree on the charged offence or the situation where the lesser offence is separately charged.
3. R v Saunders [1988] AC 148 established that, in an appropriate case, a judge may discharge a jury from returning a murder verdict where manslaughter sufficiently satisfies the interests of justice. That condition was absent here. The further proposition that the judge may do so despite prosecution opposition was treated as apparently obiter and as a potentially anomalous extension of the abuse-of-process jurisdiction.
4. The court considered the principles governing identification of the ratio of a decision with multiple grounds, citing Barking & Dagenham LBC v Argos Limited [2022] EWHC 1398 (Admin) and Youngsam [2020] QB 387. The disputed issue (iii) in R v Bayode [2013] EWCA Crim 356 was not essential to that decision, which was justified on another ground. The court was therefore not bound by it and declined to follow it.
5. The mere existence of a manslaughter conviction was no bar to a retrial for murder arising from the same killing. Any unfairness could be addressed by excluding prejudicial evidence, severing trials or staying the retrial if fairness could not otherwise be secured. Under section 35(3) of the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996, the court had no additional power to quash the unappealed manslaughter conviction.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): The appeal under section 35 of the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 was dismissed. The court confirmed that a retrial for murder was lawful.
• Crown Court: After the jury failed to agree on murder but convicted the defendant of manslaughter, the judge held at a preparatory hearing that a retrial for murder could proceed.