R v WAG

In sentencing multiple serious offences, a court may use a lead offence and increase its sentence to reflect totality. It should nevertheless impose a concurrent sentence for each serious count proved. Totality requires a fact-specific assessment. It cannot be achieved merely by moving the lead offence into a higher guideline category.

Guidance that a campaign of rape may justify a sentence of 20 years or more is contextual rather than prescriptive. On an Attorney General reference, a refusal to find dangerousness should stand where the sentencing judge’s conclusion was properly reasoned and open on the evidence.

The offender was convicted after trial at the Crown Court at Caernarfon of nine sexual offences against his stepdaughter, committed over about two and a half years from when she was 13. The offences included sexual activity with a child family member, assault by penetration, inciting sexual activity, rape and attempted rape.

On 18 December 2024, the judge imposed a determinate sentence of 15 years’ imprisonment for rape as the lead offence. He imposed no separate penalties on the other counts and declined to find the offender dangerous. The Solicitor General referred the sentences under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, contending that the total term was unduly lenient and that an extended sentence should have been imposed.

1. The reference was allowed in part. The court gave leave, quashed all of the original sentences, and substituted concurrent sentences with a total term of 18 years’ imprisonment. The challenge to the refusal to find dangerousness failed. The 18-year lead sentence was therefore determinate.
2. A lead-offence approach is conventional and acceptable in multi-count sentencing. The lead sentence may be increased to reflect the totality of the offending. However, it was flawed practice to impose no separate penalty on the other eight serious counts. Each should receive a concurrent sentence reflecting its own criminality, while the weighting for the multiplicity of offending is dealt with through the lead sentence. This also avoids a sentencing gap if the lead conviction is later quashed.
3. The court held that totality must be assessed on the facts. It is not logically justified simply to place the lead offence in a higher guideline category than its own features warrant. The guideline reference to campaigns of rape and sentences of 20 years or more is not prescriptive. Although this was not a campaign of rape, the prolonged abuse, grave breach of trust, coercion, blackmail, and devastating harm to the victim made the original 15-year total unduly lenient.
4. The substituted concurrent terms were 5 years on counts 1, 2 and 6; 7 years on count 3; 9 years on counts 4, 8 and 9; 11 years on count 5; and 18 years on count 7. Although the pre-sentence report assessed a high risk of serious harm, the sentencing judge had considered the relevant evidence and public-protection factors. His conclusion that the offender was not dangerous was properly reasoned and open to him. No extended sentence was imposed under section 279 of the Sentencing Act 2020.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division). On the Solicitor General’s reference under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, the court allowed the reference in part, quashed the original sentences, and imposed concurrent sentences totalling 18 years’ imprisonment: [2025] EWCA Crim 968.
• Crown Court at Caernarfon (HHJ Parry). On 18 December 2024, the offender was sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment for rape as the lead offence, with no separate penalties on the remaining counts. The judge found that the offender was not dangerous.