Ian Sleeper v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis

An arrest for a suspected public-order offence requires an honest suspicion, objectively reasonable grounds for that suspicion, and an objectively reasonable belief that arrest is necessary under Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, section 24. Whether words are abusive under section 5 of the Public Order Act 1986 is fact-sensitive. The words must be given their ordinary meaning and assessed in context by reference to their likely impact on a reasonable person. Section 5 does not require an imminent risk of public disorder. Convention rights must inform the assessment of reasonable suspicion and necessity, but a separate proportionality exercise is not required where the statutory test is properly applied. Lawful arrest makes detention lawful initially, subject to the requirement that its duration remains reasonable. The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was arrested and detained after displaying signs outside Southwark Cathedral stating, among other things, “Love Muslims, Hate Islam” and “Love Muslims Ban Islam the Religion of Terror”. He brought proceedings against the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis for false imprisonment and breach of his human rights.

HHJ Saggerson dismissed the claim, finding that the arresting officer reasonably suspected a religiously aggravated section 5 offence and reasonably believed arrest was necessary. The judge also found that the detention was reasonable and proportionate. The appellant appealed on issues concerning the meaning of “abusive”, imminence, Convention rights, proportionality, alternative measures, and Article 9. The central issue was whether the arrest and subsequent detention were lawful.

1. Appeal dismissed. The trial judge was entitled to find that the arrest and detention were lawful.
2. The applicable arrest test required the court to determine whether the officer genuinely suspected an offence, whether the grounds for that suspicion were objectively reasonable on the information in the officer’s mind at the time, and whether the officer reasonably believed arrest was necessary for a reason in section 24(5) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. The appellate court was not retrying the facts and would interfere only where the trial judge was plainly wrong.
3. Whether words or a sign were “abusive” under section 5 of the Public Order Act 1986 was a question of fact and degree. The words had to be given their ordinary meaning and assessed by reference to their likely impact on a reasonable person in the full factual context. The removal of “insulting” from section 5 did not prevent conduct from being both insulting and abusive. Section 5 did not require an imminent risk of public disorder.
4. Articles 10 and 11 were engaged and had to be taken into account when assessing reasonable suspicion and the necessity of arrest. They did not require a separate Strasbourg-style proportionality assessment in addition to the statutory necessity test in section 24 PACE. The trial judge had considered the rights, the public-order context, and less intrusive measures, including street bail and immediate release.
5. The judge was entitled to find that the wording, the second sign calling for Islam to be banned, the location, the recent terrorist attacks, and the surrounding circumstances supported suspicion that the conduct was abusive and likely to cause alarm or distress. The distinction between loving Muslims and hating Islam did not prevent the signs from falling within section 5.
6. Section 29J of the Public Order Act 1986 formed part of Part 3A and had no application to a section 5 offence in Part 1.
7. The Article 9 issue was academic because the Human Rights Act claim was no longer pursued. In any event, the judge was entitled to conclude that the placard lacked the required close nexus with the appellant’s religious beliefs. Even if Article 9 had been engaged, the arrest would still have been lawful.
8. Once the arrest was lawful, detention was lawful from its commencement, subject to the requirement that the whole period remained reasonable. The trial judge was entitled to find that the detention period was justified by investigation, medical assessment, legal advice and charging decisions.

• High Court (King's Bench Division): appeal from the Central London County Court dismissed. HHJ Saggerson had dismissed the claim and found the arrest and detention lawful.