Emma Rose (on behalf of Friends of Mill Road Bridge 2) v Cambridgeshire County Council

A statutory challenge to a traffic regulation order applies ordinary judicial review principles. The court does not review the planning merits or substitute its own judgment for that of the traffic authority. Predictive judgments may lawfully be based on competing evidence and uncertainty where there is sufficient material to support a conclusion within the range of reasonable decisions.

Consultation must provide sufficient, candid reasons to enable intelligent consideration and response, but it is unlawful only where the exercise has gone clearly and radically wrong. A petition is not a mandatory material consideration unless the statute expressly or impliedly requires it, or it is so obviously material that failure to consider it is irrational. Reasons may be brief and may be read with an officer’s report; they need not answer every objection or provide reasons for reasons.

The claimant challenged the validity of a traffic regulation order made by the defendant under the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984. The order restricted private vehicle access across Mill Road Bridge, while providing specified exemptions.

The claim alleged irrationality, unfair consultation, failure to take account of a petition, and inadequate reasons. The claimant argued that the council had overstated the likely effects on congestion, pollution, road safety and active travel, and had failed to explain its assessment of objections and alternative routes.

The central issues were whether the council had acted unlawfully in exercising its statutory powers, conducting consultation, assessing material considerations, or giving reasons for the order.

1. Outcome. The claim was dismissed on all four grounds.
2. The statutory challenge under paragraph 35 of Schedule 9 to the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 was governed by ordinary judicial review principles. The court could intervene for legal misdirection, irrationality, failure to consider a legally material matter or procedural impropriety, but could not conduct a merits review.
3. The council had sufficient evidence to conclude that the order would reduce through traffic, improve highway safety and encourage active travel. The evidence involved competing considerations and predictive judgments, but the conclusions were within the range of reasonable decisions open to the committee. The challenge was therefore an impermissible merits challenge.
4. The statement of reasons fairly and adequately explained the proposal. It enabled consultees to understand the council’s view and respond intelligently. The use of predictive language in officers’ supporting analysis did not contradict the committee’s final conclusions. The consultation was not clearly and radically unfair.
5. The petition was not a mandatory material consideration. Neither the statute nor the regulations expressly or impliedly required it to be considered by the committee, and it was not so obviously material that omission would be irrational. The constitution required TRO petitions to be considered by the relevant officer in consultation with local members, not by the committee. In any event, the petition was brought to the committee’s attention and was lawfully given little or no weight.
6. The reasons requirement under regulation 17(3) of the Local Authorities’ Traffic Orders (Procedure) (England and Wales) Regulations 1996 was satisfied. The statement of reasons, read with the officer’s report, left no genuine doubt about what had been decided and why. The claimant was not required to be given reasons for reasons. Even if there had been some inadequacy, substantial prejudice was not established.

This was a first-instance claim. The judgment records that an earlier 2023 traffic regulation order concerning Mill Road Bridge was quashed by consent on 6 August 2024 following earlier High Court proceedings. That earlier decision was not the decision under challenge in this claim.