Tomasz Bielicki v The Circuit Court in Lodz, Poland

In an extradition appeal based on Article 8, the appellate question is whether the district judge was wrong, rather than whether the appellate court would have reached its own preferred assessment. Where the requested person is a fugitive, the public interest in extradition is very weighty. Extradition will be disproportionate only where there are very strong counter-balancing factors, ordinarily involving exceptionally serious or severe hardship. Updated medical evidence must be capable of changing the outcome before it can justify appellate intervention. Genuine family hardship, including serious illness and the need for surgery, may remain insufficient when the family can cope, medical care is available, and the requested stay would be indefinite or uncertain.

The appellant challenged the Westminster Magistrates’ Court order of 11 July 2024 requiring his extradition to Poland under the Extradition Act 2003. The warrant sought enforcement of a three-year sentence for serious drug offences. The District Judge found that the appellant was a fugitive who had knowingly left Poland after conviction and sentencing.

Permission to appeal was initially refused, but renewal permission was granted after updated medical evidence concerning the appellant’s wife was submitted. The appeal concerned whether that evidence materially altered the Article 8 proportionality assessment and made extradition disproportionate.

1. Appeal dismissed. The order for extradition under section 21(3) of the Extradition Act 2003 remained in force.
2. Under section 21 of the Extradition Act 2003, the question was whether extradition would be compatible with Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The governing issue was whether extradition would constitute a disproportionate interference with the appellant’s private and family life, applying the principles identified in Norris v Government of the USA (No. 2) [2010] UKSC 9 and HH v Deputy Prosecutor of the Italian Republic, Genoa [2012] UKSC 25.
3. The appellate court’s task was to decide whether the District Judge was wrong. It was not entitled to substitute its own assessment. The permitted grounds included legal misdirection, an irrational or unsupported material factual finding, failure to consider a relevant factor, consideration of an irrelevant factor, or an irrational or perverse overall conclusion, applying Belbin v Regional Court of Lille, France [2015] EWHC 149 (Admin).
4. The appellant’s status as a fugitive substantially increased the public interest in extradition. Following Polish Judicial Authorities v Celinski [2015] EWHC 1274 (Admin), very strong counter-balancing factors were required before extradition could be disproportionate. The seriousness of the offending, the remaining sentence, and the public interest in ensuring that convicted persons serve their sentences reinforced that conclusion.
5. The updated evidence showed that the appellant’s wife faced a more serious medical situation and surgery. However, the family had previously coped during the appellant’s custody, continued to have emotional, practical and financial resources, and would receive state medical care. The evidence did not establish hardship that was exceptionally serious or severe in the relevant context.
6. The test for receiving new evidence was rigorous. It had to be capable of changing the outcome, as explained in Szombathely City Court v Fenyvesi [2009] EWHC 231 (Admin). The new evidence did not satisfy that substantive threshold. A temporary stay until the wife was fully healthy would in substance be indefinite, because medical recovery was uncertain and unpredictable. Such an order would be inconsistent with the nature of extradition arrangements.

• High Court (Administrative Court): appeal against the extradition order dismissed; extradition under section 21(3) of the Extradition Act 2003 stood.
• Westminster Magistrates’ Court: District Judge Law ordered extradition to Poland on 11 July 2024.
• Permission proceedings: permission was initially refused on 28 October 2024, but renewed permission was granted on 17 December 2024.