Rana Kabbani Seale v Orlando Seale & Ors

A contempt application requires proof beyond reasonable doubt that the order was clear and unambiguous, known to the defendant, intentionally breached, and breached with knowledge of the facts constituting the breach. An order remains binding unless and until it is stayed or set aside. The High Court has an inherent jurisdiction to regulate communications with the court and prevent abuse, provided access to justice is not extinguished and the restriction is proportionate. Formal applications, including applications for permission under an extended civil restraint order, must comply with the applicable procedural requirements. Sanction is fact-sensitive and must address punishment, future compliance and rehabilitation. For multiple breaches, the totality principle applies. Imprisonment may be suspended where that is sufficient to secure compliance.

The appellant was subject to an extended civil restraint order and a further order restricting her communications with court staff to routine administrative matters. She was also required to make applications formally and pay the appropriate fee. The Solicitor General applied to commit her for 28 alleged breaches arising from correspondence sent between April 2023 and April 2024.

The appellant accepted sending the correspondence but argued that the order lacked jurisdictional foundation, conflicted with the extended civil restraint order, and could not prevent her from criticising judges. The court determined liability and then the appropriate sanction.

1. Liability. The Solicitor General had to prove beyond reasonable doubt that there was a breach of a clear and unambiguous order, that the appellant knew of the order, that the relevant conduct was intentional rather than inadvertent, and that she knew the facts which made her conduct a breach. Knowledge that the order was being breached was not required: Cuadrilla Bowland Ltd v Persons Unknown [2020] 4 WLR 29.
2. An order must be obeyed unless and until it is stayed or set aside. A challenge to its validity does not excuse non-compliance. The High Court also has an inherent jurisdiction to control its processes and prevent abuse, including by restricting communications with the court, provided the litigant’s essential access to justice is preserved and the restriction is proportionate: Bhamjee v Forsdick (No 2) [2003] EWCA Civ 1113; Attorney General v Ebert [2001] EWHC Admin 694.
3. The requirement to make applications formally was consistent with the extended civil restraint order. Applications for permission were required by Part 23 to be made by application notice with the appropriate fee. The correspondence constituted deliberate conduct, and the appellant knew the contents which made it non-compliant.
4. Liability was established in at least 27 of the 28 alleged instances. Correspondence containing submissions, allegations of judicial misconduct, demands for recusal, threats, or applications for relief was not routine administration. One email exchange concerned only obtaining a transcript and was not proved to fall outside the permitted category.
5. Sanction. The court applied the principles in National Highways v Heyatawin [2021] EWHC 3078 QB. The sanction had to reflect culpability and harm and serve punishment, future compliance and rehabilitation. The totality principle applied to multiple breaches. High culpability and moderate harm justified an aggregate term of nine months before mitigation. The sentence was reduced to six months and suspended for two years. A further breach during that period could result in activation of the sentence.

The judgment records that the Court of Appeal had previously refused the appellant permission to appeal an order giving directions for the contempt hearing. The present judgment determined liability and sanction at first instance. The appellant had a right to appeal under section 13(1) and (2) of the Administration of Justice Act 1960, without permission.