Solicitor General for England and Wales v Rana Kabbani Seale

A court order must be obeyed unless and until it is set aside, stayed or discharged, even if the respondent contends that it was made without jurisdiction. The High Court has an inherent jurisdiction, exercisable in any division, to regulate abusive litigation and restrict the manner of correspondence with the court. Such restrictions are lawful where they preserve the essence of access to justice, pursue a legitimate aim and are proportionate. The Attorney General, and under the Law Officers Act 1997 the Solicitor General, may bring contempt proceedings in the public interest to enforce orders protecting court processes. On an appeal against sanction, intervention is justified only where the penalty is manifestly excessive. Civil contempt proceedings may attract costs.

The appellant was subject to an extended civil restraint order. A further order made by Bacon J restricted her correspondence with court staff to routine administrative matters and required applications to be made formally.

The Solicitor General applied to commit her for 28 alleged breaches. Mr Justice Rajah found 27 breaches and imposed six months’ imprisonment, suspended for two years, with costs: [2025] EWHC 1911 (Ch). The appellant challenged the standard of proof, the meaning and jurisdictional basis of the order, the Solicitor General’s standing, alleged interference with access to justice, procedural fairness, the sanction and costs.

Appeal dismissed. The Court of Appeal rejected all grounds of appeal.

1. Effect of court orders. Unless and until an order is set aside, stayed or discharged, compliance is mandatory. A respondent cannot decide for themselves whether an order is valid. Even an order which ought not to have been made remains effective and binding until discharged.
2. Inherent jurisdiction and access to justice. The High Court has an inherent jurisdiction to protect its processes and resources from abusive litigation. That jurisdiction is available to every division of the High Court, is additional to the express powers in the Civil Procedure Rules, and is not confined to proceedings in the Divisional Court under section 42 of the Senior Courts Act 1981. Bhamjee v Forsdick (No 2) [2003] EWCA Civ 1113, [2004] 1 WLR 88, and Attorney General v Ebert [2001] EWHC Admin 695, [2002] 2 ALL ER 789 supported that conclusion.
3. The right of access to justice is important but not unqualified. A restriction is permissible if it preserves the essence of the right, pursues a legitimate aim and is proportionate. Golder v The United Kingdom (1980) 1 E.H.R.R. 524 and Raymond v Honey [1983] AC 1 did not establish an unqualified right to correspond with the court. The order allowed applications, submissions, bundles and participation in hearings, while preventing abusive use of court resources.
4. Contempt and standing. The committal application had to be proved to the criminal standard, and the first-instance judge had applied that standard. The Attorney General may bring contempt matters before the court in the public interest: Attorney General v Times Newspapers Limited [1974] AC 273 at 293. Under sections 1(1) and 1(2) of the Law Officers Act 1997, the Solicitor General could exercise that function. There was a clear public interest in enforcing an order protecting court processes.
5. The 28 communications were properly assessed against the clear wording and examples in the order. Twenty-seven were breaches; they were not transformed into valid applications for permission under the restraint order merely because the appellant described them in that way.
6. Fairness, sanction and costs. The appellant received a fair hearing, and the evidence lodged by the probate claimants did not influence liability or sanction. The six-month custodial sentence, suspended for two years, was not manifestly excessive. The court had regard to persistence, culpability, harm and mitigation. The Civil Procedure Rules did not prevent a costs order in civil contempt proceedings, and lack of resources was not a reason to withhold an otherwise appropriate order.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Appeal against the committal order and sanction dismissed on 27 March 2026.
• High Court, Chancery Division: Mr Justice Rajah committed the appellant for contempt for six months, suspended for two years, and ordered her to pay costs: [2025] EWHC 1911 (Ch).