Kamal Egbuna v IJ Investments Limited

An appellate court should not interfere with a trial judge’s findings of fact or credibility unless the decision was plainly wrong, irrational, unsupported by the evidence, or affected by a material failure to consider relevant matters. The trial judge is generally better placed to assess live evidence and enjoys a generous ambit for disagreement. A claimant asserting a beneficial interest in property must prove a shared common intention, ordinarily by evidence of relevant contributions or conduct. Factors that might have been considered in divorce ancillary-relief proceedings cannot simply be transposed into property law. Where the evidence does not establish the required common intention, the claim fails despite sympathetic circumstances or suspicious conduct by other parties.

The appellant occupied a former matrimonial home with her children. The respondent company had purchased the property from her former husband and sought possession. The appellant contended that she had a beneficial interest arising from a shared common intention, which would have amounted to an overriding interest preventing possession.

After a two-day trial, HHJ Murch rejected that case, finding insufficient evidence of the necessary common intention, although he regarded aspects of the transaction as suspicious. The appellant appealed to the High Court on the basis that the judge had wrongly assessed her evidence, text messages, the absence of her former husband as a witness, and the surrounding circumstances. Permission to appeal was granted by McGowan J. The central issues were whether the trial judge’s factual findings were appealable and whether the evidence established a beneficial interest.

1. Appeal dismissed. The appellant had not shown that the trial judge’s decision was wrong or unjust because of a serious procedural or other irregularity.
2. Under [2014] UKSC 41, [2017] EWCA Civ 94, [2023] EWCA Civ 191 and [2022] EWCA Civ 464, an appellate court must apply a high threshold before interfering with findings of fact or credibility. The trial judge, having heard the witnesses live, is better placed to assess their evidence. The appellate court must allow a generous ambit for disagreement and must not re-try the case or subject the judgment to narrow textual analysis.
3. The judge below was entitled to find that the evidence did not establish a shared common intention giving the appellant a beneficial interest. The appellant had produced no documentary evidence of the alleged financial contributions, and the text messages did not establish the required intention. The judge’s assessment was neither irrational nor unsupported by the evidence.
4. The suspicious features of the company’s purchase and possession claim did not remove the need for the appellant to prove her own beneficial interest. The factors relevant to divorce financial relief could not be transferred into property law, where the necessary shared common intention had to be established.
5. The procedural ground also failed. No relevant procedural injustice had been demonstrated. The respondent sought no costs, and no costs order was made against the appellant.

• High Court (King’s Bench Division): appeal from an order of HHJ Murch in Watford County Court dated 26 June 2024. Permission to appeal was granted by McGowan J on 2 April 2025. The appeal was dismissed.