Andre Eugen Miron v Tirgu Bujor District Court, Romania

In extradition cases, interference with private life under article 8 ECHR will rarely outweigh the strong public interest in surrender, particularly where the requested person is a fugitive. A non-qualifying electronic curfew may be considered, but its weight depends on the actual restriction and its effect on private life. The possibility of early release in the requesting state generally carries little weight unless evidence demonstrates an overwhelming probability of release, its timing, its conditions and the consequences of this court being unable to impose equivalent conditions. An appellate court reviews the lower court’s proportionality decision and should not substitute its own sentencing assessment or second-guess the requesting state’s policy.

The appellant challenged a Westminster Magistrates’ Court order dated 14 June 2024 requiring his extradition to Romania to serve a six-month custodial sentence for breach of a restraining order. The District Judge found that he was a fugitive, having left Romania and failed to notify the Romanian authorities of his address.

Permission to appeal was granted. The appellant relied on article 8 ECHR and fresh matters, including the effect of a non-qualifying curfew, possible early release in Romania, delay, pre-settled status and developing private life. The central issues were whether the District Judge had reached a legally erroneous or irrational proportionality decision and whether the fresh matters required the balance to be reconsidered.

1. Disposition. The appeal was dismissed. Surrender was to proceed under section 21(3) of the Extradition Act 2003.
2. Appellate review. Under sections 27(3) and 27(4) of the Act, the court considered whether the District Judge ought to have decided a question differently, including in light of fresh evidence, and whether that would have required discharge. Applying Celinski v Poland and Belbin v Regional Court of Lille, France, the appellate court was concerned with whether the decision itself was wrong. It should not interfere merely because it would attach different weight to individual factors.
3. Original proportionality decision. The District Judge was entitled to treat the appellant’s fugitivity, the seriousness of the offending, the six-month sentence and the public interest in extradition as carrying substantial weight. The factual circumstances of the assault could be considered because they underpinned the breach of the restraining order. The court should not compare the Romanian sentence with a sentence that might have been imposed in the United Kingdom or otherwise resentence the appellant.
4. Fresh curfew evidence. The overnight restriction interfered with liberty and was a factor in the article 8 balance, despite being non-qualifying. Its weight was slight. The restriction had been varied to accommodate work, there was little evidence of material impact on private life, and no evidence showed that Romania would credit it against the outstanding sentence.
5. Early release. Applying Andrysiewicz v Poland, the Romanian provisions did not establish an overwhelming probability of release, when release would occur, the applicable probation conditions or that the absence of equivalent conditions in England would not adversely affect the public interest. The possibility of early release therefore carried little or no meaningful weight.
6. Fresh balancing exercise. The appellant’s developing relationship, friendships, pre-settled status, good character and delay did not materially alter the balance. The interference concerned private life, not family life, and was limited. The strong public interest in extradition, mutual confidence and respect for Romanian judicial decisions remained decisive.

• High Court (King’s Bench Division): The appeal against the Westminster Magistrates’ Court order of 14 June 2024 was dismissed. Surrender was directed to proceed under section 21(3) of the Extradition Act 2003.