AFA & Ors, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for Home Department & Anor

Under ARAP category 4, the applicant must show that the individual applicant, in the course of qualifying work, made a substantive and positive contribution to a UK military or national security objective. The relevant objective is not limited to counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics and anti-corruption; those matters are examples of a wider class. Identifying national security objectives in a particular context is principally an evaluative matter for the executive, subject to public law review. A support worker’s status or job title is not decisive, but evidence must connect that person’s own work to a material contribution to an identifiable objective. The Tameside duty does not require the court to prescribe the executive’s inquiries, and the applicant bears the evidential burden.

The claimants challenged the Secretary of State for Defence’s review decision refusing the first claimant eligibility under ARAP category 4. It was accepted that he had provided services in Afghanistan under contract to a UK Government department and therefore satisfied condition 1. The dispute concerned condition 2: whether his work on the SSMI and SSCVE programmes contributed substantively and positively to UK national security objectives with respect to Afghanistan.

The claim also alleged inadequate inquiry, legal error in assessing the programmes and the applicant’s role, and Wednesbury unreasonableness. The court considered whether the decision-maker had lawfully construed and applied ARAP 3.6.

1. Claim dismissed. The eligibility decision was academic because it had been superseded by the review decision. The challenge to the review decision therefore failed.
2. Procedural rigour is required in public law litigation. Arguments introduced in breach of an order, without permission, were not considered. The court adopted the guidance in R (Talpada) v SSHD [2018] EWCA Civ 841.
3. Immigration Rules are construed according to their language, context and purpose, while recognising their character as statements of administrative policy. The approach in R (LND1) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2024] 1 WLR 4433 and Mahad v Entry Clearance Officer [2009] UKSC 16; [2010] 1 WLR 38 was applied.
4. “National security objectives” in ARAP 3.6 is not confined to the three expressly mentioned examples. It may include wider objectives concerning stability, security, governance and the rule of law. Its meaning is a question of construction for the court, but identifying the objectives pursued in a particular context is principally an evaluative question for the executive, reviewable on Wednesbury principles. The reasoning in SSHD v Rehman [2001] UKHL 47 was relevant.
5. Condition 2 requires evidence of the individual applicant’s own substantive and positive contribution. The programme’s general objectives, or the fact that the applicant performed dangerous logistical work, were insufficient. The decision-maker was entitled to find that driving and security-support work had not materially contributed to an identifiable UK national security objective.
6. There was no breach of the Tameside duty. The applicant bore the evidential burden, was invited to provide further material, and the decision-maker considered the material supplied. The court reviews the reasonableness of the inquiry rather than prescribing its scope.