STS, R (on the application of) v The Secretary of State for Defence

[2026] EWHC 363 (Admin)

Case details

Case citations
[2026] EWHC 363 (Admin)
Court
High Court (Administrative Court)
Judgment date
20 February 2026
Judgment text

This feature is available to zoomLaw Pro members.

Subjects
Administrative Public law Irrationality
Keywords
Afghan Relocations and Assistance Policy ARAP Category 4 substantive and positive contribution national security objectives counter-narcotics irrationality anxious scrutiny judicial review
Outcome
claim dismissed
Judicial consideration

This feature is available to zoomLaw Pro members.

Summary

Eligibility under ARAP 3.6 requires an individual, not merely the employing programme or institution, to have made a substantive and positive contribution to a United Kingdom national security objective. Employment by, or services provided under contract to, a UK government department satisfies only a necessary condition and is not sufficient. The decision-maker must evaluate what the individual did and the effect of that work on the relevant objective. The contribution must be material or meaningful, but the test is not identical to the separate test for interpreters under ARAP 3.5(b). A role’s operational character, need for subject-specific knowledge, and proximity to programme delivery may be relevant factors, but are not freestanding requirements. Anxious scrutiny applies, while recognising that ARAP decisions are expedited and may contain brief reasons.

Factual background

STS, an anonymous former employee of Adam Smith International, sought relocation from Afghanistan under the Afghan Relocations and Assistance Policy. His application was considered under Category 4, ARAP 3.6. The Secretary of State accepted that he satisfied Condition 1 because ASI had provided services under contract to UK government departments, but concluded that he had not made a substantive and positive contribution to UK national security objectives under Condition 2. The review decision relied on his administrative and interpreting role in a counter-narcotics institutions project, finding that it was facilitative, non-operational and lacked subject-specific content.

Permission for judicial review had been granted by Swift J. The issue before Sheldon J was whether the conclusion on Condition 2 was irrational, including in its treatment of evidence and its assessment of the relationship between STS’s individual work and the UK’s counter-narcotics objective.

Held

  1. Application dismissed. The decision-maker’s conclusion that STS had not made a substantive and positive contribution to the UK’s counter-narcotics objective was rational.
  2. Anxious scrutiny was appropriate because of the significance of the decision. That did not require the reasons to be examined as though they were judicial reasons. ARAP is an expedited, discretion-based scheme involving judgments of fact and degree. The court should focus on the essential analysis and core findings, apply public law principles, and allow some deference to decision-makers with relevant expertise.
  3. ARAP 3.6(2) requires an evaluation of what the individual did and what effect the individual’s services had in furthering the UK’s national security objectives. Different reasonable decision-makers may reach different conclusions. Condition 1 is necessary but not sufficient.
  4. The phrase “substantive and positive contribution” is not to be equated with ARAP 3.5(b), which concerns whether UK operations would have been materially less efficient or successful without a role of that nature. Nevertheless, a contribution that is not material or meaningful cannot be substantive and positive.
  5. The decision-maker was entitled to treat STS’s role as facilitative and assisting colleagues in a programme which was not itself a UK counter-narcotics programme, but a capacity-building project with possible secondary benefits. The findings that his role was not operational and did not require subject-specific knowledge were relevant factors, not mandatory conditions. The decision-maker considered, rather than ignored, Mr Pimlott’s evidence, and was entitled to evaluate its weight.

The court’s approach to earlier authorities

This feature is available to zoomLaw Pro members.

Appellate history

This was a first-instance judicial review claim in the Administrative Court. Permission to proceed was granted by Swift J on 25 September 2025. The claim was dismissed by Sheldon J.

Key cases cited

This feature is available to zoomLaw Pro members.

Cases citing this case

This feature is available to zoomLaw Pro members.