Kamil Kazimierz Sekowski v Polish Judicial Authority

In an extradition appeal, article 8 requires a fact-sensitive proportionality assessment. The court must weigh the exceptionally strong public interest in extradition against the actual impact on the extraditee and affected family members. The rarity of successful article 8 challenges does not create a legal requirement that the case itself be exceptional. Delay may affect the balance, particularly where it bears on family or private life, but a fugitive cannot readily rely on delay which he helped cause. An electronically monitored curfew is relevant only to the extent that it restricts liberty and affects work, study or family life.

The appellant appealed against an order for his extradition to Poland to serve the balance of a sentence for robbery. Permission to appeal had been granted against the judgment of District Judge Callaway dated 13 November 2024.

Before the district judge, the appellant relied on passage of time under section 14 of the Extradition Act 2003, article 3 of the ECHR, and article 8. Before the High Court he sought to adduce further medical evidence and witness statements concerning his health, family circumstances and the effect of an electronically monitored curfew.

The central issues were whether the district judge had applied the correct article 8 approach and whether the further evidence could have produced a different result.

1. Appeal and further evidence. The appeal was dismissed. The further evidence was formally refused because, viewed with the material before the district judge, it would not have been decisive. The court was nevertheless prepared to take the appellant’s family circumstances and possible suicide attempts at their highest.
2. Appellate approach. Under the approach in Love v USA, an extradition appeal is not a rehearing. The appellate court may allow the appeal where the district judge’s overall evaluation was wrong because crucial factors ought to have been weighed so differently that the decision was wrong.
3. Article 8 test. The district judge erred by treating oppression under section 14 of the Extradition Act 2003 as the lens for the article 8 assessment. He also erred by deploying exceptionality as an actual legal test. The proper question was whether extradition would be a disproportionate interference with the article 8 rights of the appellant and affected family members, giving the children’s interests primary consideration.
4. The fact that an article 8 challenge will succeed only rarely describes the usual outcome of applying the strong public interest in extradition; it does not require a person to establish that his case is exceptional by comparison with other cases.
5. Delay did not materially reduce the public interest in extradition. The Polish authorities acted relatively promptly once they considered the appellant likely to be in the United Kingdom, and the delay by the National Crime Agency in certifying the warrant was not sufficiently reprehensible. Delay was nevertheless relevant to the assessment of the impact on private and family life.
6. The appellant was a fugitive. The offence was serious, although not at the highest end of the spectrum. The evidence did not establish exceptionally severe effects on the children or a medical risk which could not be addressed in Poland. The midnight-to-4 am curfew had a limited evidentially demonstrated impact and did not alter the balance.
7. Extradition was not disproportionate under article 8. It was also not oppressive under section 14, although that issue was not pursued. The appeal was dismissed.

• High Court (Administrative Court): Sir Peter Lane dismissed the appeal against District Judge Callaway’s order dated 13 November 2024.
• Westminster Magistrates’ Court: District Judge Callaway ordered extradition to Poland following hearings beginning on 28 June 2024.