Nicolae-Alfredo Toloii v Gaesti Court, Romania

For section 20(3) of the Extradition Act 2003, deliberate absence from trial requires proof of two matters: awareness of the criminal proceedings and charges, and an unequivocal intention not to participate or to escape prosecution. The absence of an indictment in Romanian proceedings is not an absolute bar to extradition. It is a relevant factor when assessing intention, but its significance depends on the whole factual context. Article 8 will defeat extradition only in rare cases where the impact on family life is exceptionally severe and outweighs the public interest. The court must respect the requesting state’s sentence and should not resentence the requested person by reference to domestic sentencing practice.

The appellant appealed against an extradition order made by District Judge Sarah Turnock at Westminster Magistrates’ Court on 29 July 2024. Romania sought his return under Part 1 of the Extradition Act 2003 to serve an eight-month sentence imposed for illegal tree-felling.

The appeal concerned whether he had deliberately absented himself from his trial under section 20(3), despite not having been warned that he could be tried in his absence, and whether extradition would disproportionately interfere with his and his family’s article 8 rights. Permission to appeal was granted on both grounds. The High Court also considered fresh evidence and undertook a fresh article 8 proportionality assessment.

1. The appeal was dismissed. The appellant’s fresh evidence application was refused because the evidence was not decisive, although it was considered de bene esse in the overall assessment.
2. Under section 20(3) of the Extradition Act 2003, deliberate absence reflects the Strasbourg concept of unequivocal waiver of the right to attend trial. The applicable test has two limbs: awareness of the existence of criminal proceedings and the nature and cause of the accusation; and an unequivocal intention, usually inferred from the surrounding facts, not to participate in the trial or to escape prosecution.
3. The respondent proved awareness. The appellant had been formally charged, informed that criminal proceedings had been initiated, and had made detailed admissions concerning the offences. An indictment was not required before extradition could be ordered. Its absence was nevertheless a relevant factor in assessing the strength of the inference under the second limb. It did not itself prevent extradition.
4. The second limb was proved. The appellant left Romania without informing the authorities of his United Kingdom address, despite an article 108 warning concerning summonses. The timing of his move, his detailed admissions, his failure to return after learning of the sentence, and his continuing refusal to cooperate supported the inference that he had deliberately placed himself beyond Romanian justice. The district judge’s conclusion was not wrong.
5. The court applied the section 27 appeal test by asking whether the district judge’s decision was wrong and whether a different decision would have required discharge. That threshold was not met.
6. On article 8, the court conducted a fresh proportionality assessment. The public interest in extraditing a fugitive remained strong. The appellant’s family ties and the nature of the offending were relevant, but the family impact was not exceptionally severe. The court respected the Romanian sentence and did not resentence the appellant by reference to English practice. Extradition was therefore neither disproportionate nor incompatible with article 8.

• High Court (Administrative Court) — Permission to appeal was granted by Pepperall J on 23 April 2025. Dexter Dias J dismissed the appeal against the extradition order.
• Westminster Magistrates’ Court — District Judge Sarah Turnock ordered extradition on 29 July 2024.
• Administrative Court — Permission was initially refused by Johnson J on the papers on 4 November 2024.