Cole Taylor & Anor v Secretary of State for Justice

Section 250 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 permits the Secretary of State to impose prescribed additional licence conditions on a relevant prisoner released by the Secretary of State, provided the statutory purposes governing licence conditions are met. The Parole Board’s direction is required only where the prisoner’s initial release or re-release is at the Board’s direction. The 2022 amendments therefore do not prohibit additional conditions imposed on extended determinate sentence prisoners released automatically at the end of their custodial terms. Claims founded on the contrary interpretation may be struck out where they are bound to fail. A challenge to recall which substantively contests a public-law decision may also be abusive when brought as private litigation after the Parole Board has considered recall and judicial review was available.

The claimants were extended determinate sentence prisoners released automatically at the end of their custodial terms in 2023. Their licences contained standard conditions and additional conditions concerning residence, curfew, mobile-phone possession and internet usage history. Both were recalled shortly after release for alleged breaches.

The defendant initially admitted that the additional conditions were unlawful, but later sought permission to withdraw those admissions, amend its defences and strike out the claims. The central issue was whether ss.250(5A)–(5C) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, as amended in 2022, required Parole Board direction whenever a relevant prisoner received additional conditions, or only where release itself was directed by the Board.

1. Statutory construction. The court adopted the straightforward interpretation of ss.250(5A)–(5C) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. The prohibition on additional conditions applies to a relevant prisoner whose initial release or re-release is at the direction of the Parole Board. It does not apply where the Secretary of State releases or re-releases the prisoner without Board involvement. The statutory language, structure, legislative history, explanatory material and statutory purpose all supported that construction.
2. Extended determinate sentence prisoners released automatically at the end of their custodial terms are relevant prisoners under s.250(5C), but their licences do not fall within s.250(5B). The Secretary of State therefore retained the discretion under s.250(4)(b)(ii), subject to s.250(8) and any relevant statutory requirements, to impose prescribed additional conditions.
3. The common-law presumptions of legality and non-retroactivity, s.3 of the Human Rights Act 1998, and Arts.5, 7, 8 and 14 ECHR did not require a different interpretation. The additional conditions were imposed under statutory authority. Their imposition did not contravene Art.5, and the interference with private and family life was justified under Art.8(2).
4. The court applied the two-stage approach in R(Calder) v Secretary of State for Justice: whether there were reasonable grounds to conclude that licence conditions had been breached, and whether recall was necessary for public protection. Probation’s conclusions were supported by contemporaneous reports and the circumstances of each case. The Parole Board had also found both recalls appropriate.
5. The recall challenges were in any event substantially public-law challenges brought outside the judicial-review framework, after the Parole Board had considered recall. They were therefore abusive, as well as bound to fail on the merits. The data-protection claims founded on the alleged unlawfulness of the additional conditions likewise failed. Claims concerning other alleged inaccuracies were either not inaccurate, concerned opinions or allegations rather than recorded facts, or caused no damage.
6. The defendant was permitted to withdraw its admissions and amend its defences. The current Particulars of Claim were struck out under CPR 3.4(2)(a) and (b). Permission to amend was refused save for unrelated claims concerning the seizure of legal papers, which could proceed under the existing claim numbers for pragmatic reasons. Permission to appeal was refused, with time extended to 31 January 2026.

First-instance decision. No prior appellate decision was identified in the judgment.