Bhupinder Iffat Rizvi, R (on the application of) v HM Assistant Coroner for South London

In an Article 2 inquest, the low threshold of an arguable breach determines whether the enhanced procedural investigation is required. Once the inquest has proceeded and the evidence is complete, the coroner must apply the applicable Galbraith test when deciding whether factual issues should be left to the jury. The court’s supervisory jurisdiction is not an appeal on the evidence. A ruling may be challenged only for public-law error, failure to take account of a material consideration, taking account of an irrelevant consideration, or Wednesbury unreasonableness.

Causation cannot be considered in the abstract. It must relate to identified acts or omissions which satisfy the evidential threshold for leaving the issue to the jury. Delay in judicial review proceedings is assessed by considering all the circumstances, including the importance and merits of the claim, prejudice and the interests of good administration.

Sabina Rizvi was murdered after leaving a police station in 2003. Following the conviction of Paul Asbury, an Article 2 inquest was resumed to examine whether the police had failed to protect her from a real and immediate risk to her life.

After hearing the evidence, the Assistant Coroner declined to leave to the jury issues concerning police knowledge of the risk, reasonable preventative measures, or causation. The jury returned a short-form verdict of unlawful killing.

Mrs Rizvi sought permission to bring judicial review proceedings, challenging the Coroner’s application of the Galbraith test and her treatment of causation. She also sought an extension of time. The central issues were whether the claim was arguable and whether time should be extended.

1. Extension of time. The court refused the application to extend time. The claim was subject to the requirements that it be brought promptly and within three months under CPR r 54.5(1). The court considered the unexplained periods of delay, the claimant’s personal difficulties, the importance of the issues, the very challenging prospects of success, prejudice, continuing stress, the age of the events and the detrimental effect of prolonging legal uncertainty. The fact that legal aid was required was relevant but did not explain all the delay.
2. Ground 1. The Coroner asked the correct question. By the end of the evidence, the issue was not whether an Article 2 inquest was arguably required. That issue had already been resolved. The question was whether there was sufficient evidence, applying Galbraith, for factual predicates of the substantive Article 2 operational duty to be left to the jury. The parties had all conducted the inquest on that basis.
3. The Coroner correctly treated the relevant factual issues as including whether the police knew or ought to have known of a real and immediate risk from criminal acts and whether reasonable measures within their powers might have avoided it. The description of the real and immediate threshold as high did not establish an error of law, particularly because the Coroner accepted that a risk at the requisite level existed but found insufficient evidence that any police officer knew or ought to have known of it.
4. The criticisms of the Coroner’s evaluation of the evidence concerning the off-the-record conversation and the offer of a lift were attacks on the merits of the factual assessment. They did not disclose a public-law error or show that no reasonable coroner, properly directing herself, could have reached the conclusions reached.
5. Ground 2. The Coroner did not elide Article 2 liability and causation. She considered the alleged police acts and omissions which had been identified as potentially causative and concluded that none satisfied the Galbraith threshold. Causation could not sensibly be considered in the abstract without an identified act or omission capable of being causative.
6. The application for permission to bring judicial review proceedings was refused.

First-instance judicial review and extension-of-time application. The High Court refused an extension of time and refused permission to bring judicial review proceedings.