Police Officer B50, R (on the application of) v His Majesty's Assistant Coroner for the East Riding of Yorkshire and Kingston upon Hull

When deciding which conclusions to leave to an inquest jury, a coroner must apply the Galbraith plus approach: there must be evidence on which a properly directed jury could properly reach the conclusion, and it must be safe to leave it to them. The safety limb does not permit the coroner to substitute his or her assessment of the evidence for that of the jury. Where the evidence raises a genuine factual issue depending on credibility or weight, the issue should ordinarily be left to the jury. A coroner may act as a filter against injustice, confusion or conclusions which do not reflect the thrust of the evidence. A summing-up is adequate if, viewed as a whole, it enables the jury to understand and decide the material issues.

Lewis Skelton was shot and killed by Police Officer B50 during an armed police response. At the inquest, the jury returned a conclusion of unlawful killing. B50 sought judicial review of the assistant coroner’s decision to leave unlawful killing to the jury and of the jury’s conclusion.

The claim alleged that the coroner misapplied the Galbraith plus test, that the evidence was insufficient to support unlawful killing, and that the summing-up was deficient. The central issue was whether the evidence permitted, and safely permitted, a properly directed jury to determine that B50 did not genuinely believe that shooting was necessary to protect others from an imminent threat.

1. Ground 1 dismissed. The coroner correctly identified the applicable test, comprising evidential sufficiency and safety. His references to the genuineness of B50’s belief as the central issue implicitly recorded that there was sufficient evidence for the issue to go to the jury. The absence of a separate express finding on safety was not fatal. In the ordinary case, sufficient evidence on which a properly directed jury could properly reach a conclusion will also make it safe to leave that conclusion.
2. The safety limb is not a free-standing licence to withdraw a conclusion merely because the coroner considers one outcome unlikely or disagrees with it. It may address wider interests of justice, including confusion, overburdening the jury or a conclusion which does not reflect the thrust of the evidence. It must not usurp the jury’s fact-finding function.
3. Ground 2 dismissed. The evidence supporting B50’s asserted belief was capable of supporting his case, but substantial contrary evidence was also available. The jury could properly conclude that the belief in an imminent threat to the workmen was not genuine. Whether the court would have reached that conclusion was irrelevant and would have trespassed on the jury’s province.
4. Ground 3 dismissed. The initial explanation of the relevance of reasonableness was maladroit, and the summing-up was longer than necessary. However, the coroner later gave full written and oral directions, which correctly explained the legal test. The summing-up, read as a whole, enabled the jury to identify and assess the relevant evidence. Its deficiencies did not render the conclusion unsafe.
5. The claim was dismissed. The jury’s conclusion of unlawful killing was left undisturbed.

First-instance judicial review proceedings in the Administrative Court. The court dismissed the challenge to the assistant coroner’s rulings and to the jury’s conclusion of unlawful killing.