Sharman v HM Coroner for Inner North London & Anor

In an inquest involving a possible verdict of unlawful killing, the issue is whether it would be safe for the jury to conclude beyond reasonable doubt that self-defence had been disproved. The prosecution’s burden must be considered in the context of the subjective belief relied upon, including an honestly held but mistaken belief in an imminent threat. Rejection of the officers’ account does not by itself establish absence of that belief. The coroner must assess the whole evidence and give a clear direction on belief, imminence and the burden of proof.

Harry Stanley was shot dead by a police officer in September 1999. A first inquest verdict was quashed in 2003. A second inquest, held in October 2004, returned a verdict of unlawful killing, which in this case could only mean murder.

Leveson J quashed the verdict, holding that the coroner should not have left unlawful killing to the jury and that the summing-up was inadequate: [2005] EWHC 857 Admin. Tuckey LJ refused permission on paper, but considered the first issue arguable and the summing-up criticism clearly correct. Mrs Stanley renewed the application before the Court of Appeal.

1. Permission refused and appeal dismissed. It would not be safe, on the facts, for the jury to return a verdict of unlawful killing.
2. Section 3 of the Criminal Law Act 1977 provides the relevant statutory framework for self-defence. The belief relied upon is assessed subjectively, even if mistaken, and self-defence must be negatived to the criminal standard.
3. The ordinary Galbraith approach must be adapted to this context. The question is whether there is sufficient evidence for the jury safely to conclude beyond reasonable doubt that self-defence was not made out. The coroner must consider the whole circumstances.
4. Rejection of the officers’ account as fabricated or untruthful did not by itself establish absence of an honest belief in an imminent threat. That belief could remain possible despite subsequent fabrication, panic or fear.
5. The summing-up was materially deficient because it focused on general veracity rather than the specific belief in an imminent threat, failed adequately to explain imminence and the burden of proof, and did not identify the evidence said to rebut the officers’ account.
6. Agreement by the parties with the coroner’s approach could not prevent judicial review of its legal correctness.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division) — Permission to appeal was refused and the appeal was dismissed.
• High Court, Administrative Court — Leveson J quashed the second inquest’s unlawful-killing verdict: [2005] EWHC 857 Admin.
• Second inquest — An inquest in October 2004 returned a verdict of unlawful killing.
• Earlier Administrative Court proceedings — The verdict of the 2002 inquest was quashed in April 2003.