R v R

An appeal against family fact-finding orders will succeed only where the decision was wrong or unjust because of a serious procedural irregularity. Vulnerability directions require the court to secure a fair hearing, but advocates’ toolkits remain guidance to be considered in the overall conduct of the trial. The appellate court must assess whether alleged factual errors could realistically have affected the material findings, rather than revisit inconsequential detail. A fact-finding judge must consider the evidence holistically and should not be unduly confined by a Scott Schedule. However, an appellant must identify a properly arguable failure in the judge’s reasoning or evaluation.

The applicant mother appealed findings of fact made by a District Judge in private law children proceedings concerning allegations of domestic abuse, manipulation and obstruction of the father’s relationship with the children. The District Judge had designated the mother as vulnerable and made participation directions under the Family Procedure Rules and Practice Directions. The mother challenged the conduct of cross-examination, alleged factual errors, the assessment of medical-record evidence, the adequacy of reasons, the use of Scott Schedules and the treatment of contact evidence.

Permission was granted on the vulnerable-witness ground because it raised a compelling reason to hear the appeal. Permission was refused on the remaining grounds. The central issue was whether the fact-finding decision was wrong or unjust because of a serious procedural irregularity.

1. Outcome. Permission to appeal was granted on Ground 1 and, after hearing it, the ground was dismissed. Permission was refused on Grounds 2 to 6 because they had no real prospect of success and raised no compelling reason for an appeal. The appeal was dismissed.
2. Vulnerable witness. The court was required to consider Family Procedure Rule 3A, Practice Direction 3AA and the overall fairness of the proceedings. Paragraph 5.7 of Practice Direction 3AA made advocates expected to be familiar with the techniques in the Advocates’ Toolkit. The Toolkit should normally be followed, but it was guidance principally directed to advocates and litigants in person. It did not displace the court’s duty to maintain a fair adversarial hearing or the advocate’s right to put the client’s case.
3. The District Judge had correctly designated the mother as vulnerable and had made participation directions. At trial she permitted an adjournment, breaks, slower questioning, assistance with documents, interventions concerning the Toolkit and additional hearing time. The High Court was satisfied that the mother received a fair hearing and that the alleged breaches did not establish a serious procedural irregularity.
4. Appellate review of factual findings. Applying the approach in Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464; [2022] 4 WLR 48, minor factual inaccuracies will not justify appellate intervention unless they could realistically have affected the judge’s analysis or material findings. The District Judge was best placed to assess credibility after hearing and reading the evidence.
5. The complaint concerning medical records misread the judgment. The District Judge had accepted that the discrepancies in the medical evidence were innocuous and had found only that the evidence generally had been manipulated. The reasons challenge and the challenge to the contact findings likewise disclosed no arguable failure to consider the relevant evidence.
6. Holistic assessment. The fact-finding judge had to consider all the evidence and was not unduly tied to the pleaded case or a Scott Schedule. Specific incidents could form part of a wider pattern of controlling or coercive behaviour. The District Judge had applied those principles and had given adequate reasons.

1. Family Court, Northampton. District Judge Bridson made findings of fact following a contested trial in private law children proceedings and handed down judgment and order on 2 September 2025.
2. High Court (Family Division). McKendrick J granted permission on Ground 1, dismissed that ground after hearing it, refused permission on Grounds 2 to 6, and dismissed the appeal.