Debra Cheryl Inman v Trust Alliance Group Ltd

Permission to appeal is governed by whether the proposed appeal has a real prospect of success or there is another compelling reason for it to be heard. An appeal court does not rehear a discretionary decision. It intervenes only for an error of law or fact, failure to consider a material factor, consideration of an irrelevant factor, serious procedural irregularity, or a decision outside the generous ambit of reasonable disagreement.

For limitation under section 118 of the Equality Act 2010, conduct extending over a period concerns conduct of the defendant. Conduct by the defendant’s solicitors does not extend the limitation period unless the solicitors are themselves defendants in their capacity as agents. Fresh evidence on appeal must satisfy the principles in Ladd v Marshall.

The appellant brought Equality Act 2010 and Protection from Harassment Act 1997 claims concerning her treatment by the respondent in 2017. The County Court at Reading refused to extend the Equality Act limitation period under section 118(1)(b) and dismissed applications concerning the respondent’s solicitors. The appellant filed her appeal notice 36 days late.

After procedural orders and extensions, Soole J extended time but refused permission to appeal on 2 March 2025. The appellant renewed her application before the High Court. The central issues were whether the County Court’s discretionary limitation decision or its case-management decisions were arguably wrong, whether fresh evidence should be admitted, and whether the solicitors’ conduct constituted a continuing act under section 118(6)(a).

1. Permission refused. The proposed appeal had no real prospect of success and there was no other compelling reason for it to be heard.
2. The County Court had exercised its broad discretion under section 118(1)(b) of the Equality Act 2010. It considered the appellant’s mental health, legal knowledge, the length of the delay, her choice to pursue other proceedings, prejudice to the respondent, and the staleness of the evidence. There was no arguable error in that assessment.
3. The appellate court’s task was not to substitute its own view. Under [2012] EWCA Civ 1743, approved in [2014] UKSC 64 and supported by [2017] UKSC 55, intervention in a discretionary or case-management decision requires misdirection, failure to consider a relevant matter, consideration of an irrelevant matter, or a plainly wrong decision outside the generous ambit of reasonable disagreement.
4. The appellant’s continuing-act argument failed. Section 118(6)(a) refers to conduct of the defendant because it informs the primary limitation period in section 118(1)(a). Correspondence by the respondent’s solicitors did not constitute conduct by the respondent for this purpose. The position would be different if the solicitors were defendants in their capacity as purported agents.
5. The proposed fresh evidence did not satisfy the applicable Ladd v Marshall criteria. It was available before the County Court hearing and would not probably have materially influenced the result.
6. The decision to determine limitation as a preliminary issue was permissible. It could save time and resources where failure to extend time would dispose of the Equality Act claim, and the factual dispute could appropriately be determined from the evidence.
7. The applications concerning the solicitors were properly dismissed as case-management applications. No arguable procedural or legal error was shown. There was no order for costs on the appeal; the County Court costs orders remained in force.

• High Court (King’s Bench Division): renewed application for permission refused in [2025] EWHC 3217 (KB).
• County Court at Reading: HHJ Bloom’s order dated 25 July 2022 refused an extension of the Equality Act limitation period and dismissed applications concerning the respondent’s solicitors.
• High Court: Soole J refused permission on the papers on 2 March 2025, after extending time for the appeal to be brought.