Rafal Mentel v Regional Court of Poznan (Poland)

In an extradition appeal under the Extradition Act 2003, delay and time spent on curfew may affect the Article 8 proportionality balance. Delay carries less weight where the requested person is a fugitive, and sequential issue of warrants does not itself establish culpable delay. Curfew attracts greater weight where evidence shows a material effect on work, study or family life; an ordinary overnight curfew without such evidence may carry little weight. The court must assess all factors, including the public interest in extradition and the seriousness of the offending. Significant disruption to family life is insufficient without an exceptionally severe impact.

The appellant challenged an order made by District Judge Leake on 23 April 2024 directing his extradition to Poland to serve the balance of a custodial sentence for serious offending involving attempted extortion and receiving stolen goods. He relied on Article 8 of the Convention, delay by the Polish authorities, the length of his electronically monitored curfew, and the impact of extradition on his settled life and family.

He also sought to adduce fresh evidence concerning his family’s health and his own health. The central issues were whether the District Judge had approached delay and curfew correctly, whether the fresh evidence should be admitted, and whether the proportionality balance required discharge.

1. Appeal dismissed. Under section 27 of the Extradition Act 2003, the question was whether the District Judge ought to have decided a question differently so as to require discharge, or whether fresh material would have changed the decision.
2. The fresh evidence was refused. The applicable two-stage approach required the evidence to have been unavailable below with reasonable diligence and to be decisive. The further material would not have altered the District Judge’s conclusions, particularly as the judge already knew of the relevant family difficulties and there was no evidence that necessary treatment would be unavailable in Poland.
3. The passage of time since the offending was relevant because family ties and roots in the United Kingdom had developed. However, the appellant’s fugitive status substantially reduced the weight attributable to delay. The six-month period between the Polish authorities learning that he was in the United Kingdom and issuing the extortion warrant did not establish culpable delay. Sequential issue of warrants was not, without more, evidence of fault.
4. Curfew could be relevant to the Article 8 balance even though it would not reduce a sentence in the United Kingdom. Its weight depended on its practical effect. Here there was no evidence that the overnight curfew materially affected work, private life or family life. The District Judge therefore gave it proper, but limited, weight.
5. The Article 8 balance favoured extradition. The appellant’s settled life, family hardship, financial consequences and curfew counted against extradition. Against those factors stood the seriousness of the offences, the outstanding custodial sentence, the appellant’s fugitive status, breach of conditional release, and the public interest in the United Kingdom not becoming a safe haven for fugitives. The impact on family life, although significant, was not exceptionally severe.

Even on the basis of a fresh balancing exercise taking account of the updated material, the result would have been the same.

• High Court (Administrative Court): Appeal against the extradition order dismissed.
• Westminster Magistrates’ Court: District Judge Leake ordered extradition on 23 April 2024.
• High Court: Permission to appeal was granted by Sheldon J on 22 July 2024. A stay pending the Supreme Court’s judgment in Andrysiewicz v Poland was later lifted.