FC & Anor, R (on the application of) v Bristol City Council

A section 47 inquiry under the Children Act 1989 is directed to objectively assessing whether a child is suffering, or is likely to suffer, significant harm. It does not require attribution of blame to a parent or carer. Once significant harm concerns are substantiated, a child protection plan may rationally be made even where the principal risks arise from disability, illness, inadequate support or complex family circumstances.

Child protection plans and child-in-need plans serve different purposes. The former provide a structured, sustained, multi-agency mechanism focused on child safety. The glossary in Working Together 2018 gives broad guidance, not a strict legal test. Emotional abuse may arise unintentionally, through omission, and may overlap with neglect. A category should be selected holistically as the best descriptor of the primary presenting concern.

The claimants, two disabled children, challenged Bristol City Council’s decision that child protection plans made in August 2023 had been lawful. The plans followed section 47 enquiries prompted by concerns about risks arising from the children’s complex needs, their mother’s dissociative episodes and paralysis, and the father’s carer burnout.

The claimants argued that the significant-harm threshold had not been rationally established, that child-in-need services under the Children Act 1989 should have been used instead of child protection plans, and that describing the primary concern as emotional abuse was irrational. They also alleged disproportionate interference with article 8 rights. The central questions were whether the decisions were irrational and whether the plans were the least intrusive and fairly balanced measures for protecting the children.

1. Ground 1 dismissed. The section 47 test is concerned with the harm suffered or likely to be suffered by the child. Unlike section 31, it contains no requirement that the harm be attributable to parental care or culpable conduct. The authority was therefore entitled to assess the risk objectively, without attributing blame to the parents.
2. The decision that significant harm concerns were substantiated fell within the range of reasonable decisions open to the authority. The court applied a context-sensitive rationality review, including anxious scrutiny because of the consequences for the children and family. The evidence of escalating physical and emotional risks justified the conclusion.
3. Child protection plans have no independent statutory basis. They operate through statutory guidance issued under section 7(1) of the Local Authority Social Services Act 1970. Following substantiation of significant harm, the guidance creates a strong presumption in favour of a plan, subject to good reason for departure. A child-in-need plan and a child protection plan are not interchangeable. The latter provides sustained, structured and coordinated multi-agency monitoring directed specifically to child safety. Section 17 services may form part of that package.
4. The decision to make the plans was therefore rational. The absence of parental fault did not prevent the plans from being protective rather than punitive, and the worsening risk profile supplied compelling reasons to follow the guidance.
5. The decision to describe the primary presenting concern as emotional abuse was also rational. Although the statutory guidance no longer requires a category, the local guidance permitted one to be assigned. The glossary definition is indicative, not a strict legal test. Emotional abuse may be unintended, arise through omission, and overlap with neglect. The proper approach is holistic and selects the best-fitting descriptor. The plans would not necessarily be unlawful merely because a category label was irrational.
6. Ground 2 dismissed. Applying the proportionality approach in Shvidler, the court made its own assessment. Protecting the children from future significant harm was a legitimate and important aim. The plans were rationally connected to it, were the least intrusive measure that would not unacceptably compromise that aim, and struck a fair balance under article 8. The claim was dismissed.

The claim was a first-instance judicial review. Permission was initially refused on the papers and on oral renewal. On 6 December 2024, Falk LJ granted permission without an oral hearing and remitted the claim to the Administrative Court. The Administrative Court dismissed the claim.