XUY, R (on the application of) v London Borough of Croydon

A local authority may convene a child protection conference or make a Child Protection Plan under Children Act 1989, section 47, only after sufficient enquiries support a rational conclusion that a child is suffering or likely to suffer significant harm. Incomplete assessment, unknowns or mere possibility are insufficient. Section 47 is wider than section 31: parental attribution of neglect, abuse or exploitation is not a precondition. Further assessment may form part of a plan, but non-cooperation cannot substitute for the threshold; a section 43 assessment order is the proper route where access cannot be agreed. A vulnerable child facing imminent homelessness may satisfy the threshold. An unlawful process can engage Article 8, and relief cannot be withheld where the court would have to speculate about the lawful counterfactual. A plan’s inseparable lawful and unlawful parts may require the whole plan to be quashed.

The Council made a Child Protection Plan for five of six children after concerns about conflict at home, an ultimatum requiring B to leave or accept boarding school, and limited parental cooperation with a Children Act 1989 assessment. The claimant challenged the statutory threshold, the inclusion of social-media issues, repeated attempts to enter the home and threats to involve police, and alleged breaches of Article 8 under the Human Rights Act 1998.

The court found that the imminent risk of B becoming homeless could support a plan, but that the evidence and assessment concerning C, D, E and F did not establish actual or likely significant harm. The court also considered whether the plan could be severed, whether relief should be withheld under section 31(2A) of the Senior Courts Act 1981, and whether the remaining conduct breached Article 8.

1. Under section 47 of the Children Act 1989 and Working Together, a child protection conference and Child Protection Plan required a rational conclusion, following sufficient enquiries and supported by adequate reasons, that a child was suffering or likely to suffer significant harm. Professional judgment was permissible and conventional proof was not essential, but mere possibility, generalized risk, incomplete assessment or unknowns could not satisfy the threshold. The approach was consistent with R (S) v Swindon BC [2001] EWHC Admin 334.

2. Section 47 concerned a wider range of harm than section 31. Parental attribution of neglect, abuse or exploitation was not a precondition to a conference or plan. The judge agreed with the analysis in R (ONO FC, SC) (Children by their mother and litigation friend LF) v Bristol City Council [2025] EWHC 3227 (Admin) and confined the relevance of R (O) v Peterborough City Council [2016] EWHC 2717 (Admin) to its particular factual basis.

3. Further assessment could occur under a Child Protection Plan, but parental non-cooperation could not itself justify progressing from incomplete section 47 enquiries to a conference and plan. Where assessment could not be agreed, the local authority should use the section 43(1) child assessment order mechanism.

4. B’s imminent enforced departure from the family home, with no secure alternative accommodation and against his wishes, could amount to likely significant harm. The plan was therefore lawful insofar as it addressed that risk. The position of C, D, E and F was different: the Council lacked sufficient information to identify actual or likely significant harm, and the alleged risks from B or social-media restrictions were speculative. The plan was unlawful in respect of them.

5. The lawful and unlawful elements could not practically be separated. The whole plan was quashed, with a declaration that not every part of it was unlawful. Relief was not withheld under section 31(2A) of the Senior Courts Act 1981, applying R (Bradbury) v Awdurdod Parc Cenedlaethol Bannau Brycheiniog (Brecon Beacons National Park Authority) [2025] EWCA Civ 489, because the court would have had to speculate what several decision-makers would have decided with a comprehensive assessment.

6. The social-media grounds failed because the Council had not made the decision alleged. A Child Protection Plan did interfere with Article 8 interests, and an unlawfully made plan was not in accordance with the law. Requests to enter the home, when refused and not enforced, did not on the facts interfere with private or family life. Even if they had amounted to an interference, they were not unjustifiable in the circumstances; overriding refusal would require greater justification and, absent an emergency, due process. The threat to involve police was inappropriate but did not itself create an Article 8 breach.

7. The claim therefore succeeded in part. The Child Protection Plan was quashed, the remaining grounds failed, and there was no order for costs.

First-instance judicial review. Permission was initially refused by Deputy High Court Judge Marcus Pilgerstorfer KC on 18 November 2025, then granted on oral renewal by HHJ Dunne on 27 January 2026.