Mariusz Sowinski v Polish Judicial Authority

For the purposes of the passage-of-time bar in section 14 of the Extradition Act 2003, a person may be a fugitive where, knowing that a legal process has begun to enforce an outstanding sentence, he leaves the requesting state and thereby places himself beyond that process. The absence of a legal obligation to remain, including because of the speciality principle, does not prevent that conclusion.

On an Article 8 proportionality appeal, unexplained delay by the executing state may increase the weight of interference with private and family life. It does not necessarily outweigh the public interest in extradition, particularly where the requested person knowingly left to avoid enforcement of a serious sentence. The appellate court must decide whether the lower court reached the wrong outcome.

The appellant appealed under section 26 of the Extradition Act 2003 against the Westminster Magistrates’ Court order of 18 January 2023 requiring his surrender to Poland under section 21(3) of the Act. He was wanted to serve 646 days of a combined three-year sentence for three offences.

The appeal challenged findings that extradition was not barred as oppressive by reason of delay under section 14, and that surrender would not be a disproportionate interference with Article 8 rights. The central issues were whether the appellant was a fugitive despite protection under the speciality principle, and whether periods of unexplained delay altered the Article 8 balance.

1. Appeal dismissed. Neither ground satisfied the conditions in section 27 of the Extradition Act 2003. The order for surrender therefore stood.
2. The District Judge was entitled to find that the appellant was a fugitive. He knew that Poland had begun proceedings to obtain consent to enforce his outstanding sentences. He left Poland for the United Kingdom in order to avoid the prospect of being returned to custody. By doing so, he knowingly placed himself beyond the reach of the Polish legal process.
3. The speciality principle under article 27 of the Framework Decision temporarily prevented enforcement of the outstanding sentences while the appellant remained in Poland. It did not prevent him from being a fugitive when he knowingly used that protection as the opportunity to leave Poland and place himself beyond the requesting state’s jurisdiction.
4. The authorities distinguish a person who is already outside the requesting state when informed of the relevant process, and who merely declines to return. The appellant had instead been in Poland, had been notified of the consent proceedings, and had taken the positive step of leaving.
5. For Article 8 proportionality, the appellate question was whether the District Judge reached the wrong decision, with appropriate respect for factual findings: Polish Judicial Authority v Celinski [2015] EWHC 1274 (Admin). Unexplained delay may affect the weight attached to interference with private and family life: Pabian v Poland [2024] EWHC 2431 (Admin).
6. The nearly five-year delay between issue and certification of the arrest warrant was unexplained and materially increased the interference with the appellant’s established family and working life. The first period of delay did not materially weaken the public interest because the appellant knew that he remained liable to serve the sentence.
7. Balancing the strengthened Article 8 interference against the seriousness of the offences, the substantial remaining sentence, the appellant’s fugitive status and the strong public interest in extradition, surrender remained proportionate. The District Judge had reached the right decision.

• High Court (Administrative Court): Appeal under section 26 of the Extradition Act 2003 dismissed; the Westminster Magistrates’ Court order was upheld.
• Westminster Magistrates’ Court: On 18 January 2023, ordered surrender to Poland under section 21(3) of the Extradition Act 2003.